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INTRODUCTION
Under the Uniform Securities Act (Act or USA),' in-house accountants, an-
alysts, attorneys, and other inside gatekeepers may be held responsible for run-
ning afoul of the secondary liability provisions of the USA, while their outside
counterparts will escape liability. As a result, an inherent inequity in treatment
exists between inside and outside actors in private state securities litigation.
Gatekeepers are actors, often attorneys and accountants in a securities con-
text, who are well-situated to detect fraud or other improper conduct and are
able to withhold their essential services in an effort to prevent such fraud or im-
proper conduct from occurring or continuing.' These actors have been an es-
sential part of the U.S. financial system for well over a century. As early as 19oo,
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) instituted public reporting requirements
mandating that listed companies publish financial statements certified by an in-
dependent auditor.' In 1964, the eminent Judge Friendly eloquently analogized
the role of attorneys and accountants in corporate governance. He explained:
"In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion
can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or
1. UNIF. SEC. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2005).
2. See, e.g., Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1170-71 (2014) (quoting S. REP. NO.
107-146, at 2 (2002)) ("Emphasizing the importance of outside professionals as
'gatekeepers who detect and deter fraud,' the Senate Report concludes: 'Congress
must reconsider the incentive system that has been set up that encourages ac-
countants and lawyers who come across fraud in their work to remain silent."').
Attorneys and auditors provide their reputational status in the securities setting,
which in turn provides validity to a transaction and comfort to investors and
shareholders. See Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F-3d 144, 156
(2d Cir. 2010) ("Where statements are publicly attributed to a well-known national
law or accounting firm, buyers and sellers of securities (and the market generally)
are more likely to credit the accuracy of those statements."); see also Stephen Choi,
Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 916-18 (1998) (discussing
traditional gatekeeper intervention); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeep-
er: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2003) (explaining the
role gatekeepers play in the arena of securities regulation and giving examples);
Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers To Improve the
Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1993) (discussing the
role of attorneys as gatekeepers and effective gatekeeping regimes); Reinier H.
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE
L.J. 857, 888-98 (1984) (discussing the role of gatekeepers generally and the logic
behind gatekeeper liability).
3. John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper: Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302 n.1 (2004); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise
of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Owner-
ship and Control, in YALE L.J. 1, 37 (2001); David F. Hawkins, The Development of
Modern Financial Reporting Practices Among American Manufacturing Corpora-
tions, 37 Bus. HIST. REV. 135, 149-50 (1963).
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the crowbar." 4 Indeed, effective gatekeepers are imperative to enhancing market
integrity and protecting the investing public.
The Uniform Securities Act is an important legislative component in incen-
tivizing proper gatekeeper behavior and regulating the securities markets. As a
uniform law, one of its fundamental purposes is to standardize securities law
across the states.5 It is ironic, then, that the USA lacks uniformity in its treat-
ment of gatekeepers in securities transactions. That is, two attorneys, one em-
ployed as in-house counsel and the other retained as outside counsel, who pre-
pare identical documents and play identical roles in a securities offering that
violates the law, cannot necessarily expect the same legal consequences. Under
the USA, the outside lawyer avoids civil liability while the in-house attorney is
subject to liability for the securities violations of his or her client. This follows
from the language of the USA as adopted by the majority of states coupled with
the interpretation of that language by the courts.6
In this way, the USA provisions governing civil liability have led to a regula-
tory abyss, which allows many of those who are as well situated as inside actors
(including inside counsel) to uncover and prevent securities violations-
namely, outside accountants, lawyers, and other outside gatekeepers-to mate-
rially aid primary violators without incurring liability in private actions under
the securities laws.7 As a result, professionals in similar positions suffer dispar-
4. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964).
5. Uniform Securities Act (Last Revised or Amended in 2005), NAT'L CONF.
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LAWS (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.uniformlaws
.org/shared/docs/securities/securities-final-os.pdf [http://perma.cc/8JRR-MTLF]
(stating that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) "provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted
legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law....
NCCUSL strengthens the federal system by providing rules and procedures that
are consistent from state to state but that also reflect the diverse experiences of the
states" and noting "the technical challenge of drafting a new Act that could achieve
the basic goal of uniformity among states and with applicable federal law").
6. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. Note that this Article uses the terms
"inside" counsel and "in-house" counsel interchangeably-meaning an attorney
who is an employee of the subject enterprise. The same holds true for other "in-
side" or "in-house" professionals-signifying that they are employees of the sub-
ject enterprise.
7. It is important to note that federal securities laws do not fill this regulatory abyss,
as there is no aiding and abetting liability in private actions under the federal secu-
rities laws, i.e., Section io(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See Cent. Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Marc I.
Steinberg, The Ramifications ofRecent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal and
State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489 (1995); see also, e.g., In re
Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), affd, Pac. Inv.
Mgmt. Co., 603 F.3d at 148 ("The core issue before the Court is whether the plain-
tiff-investors can hold Refco's outside counsel liable for their injury pursuant to §§
io(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Although the Complaint al-
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ate treatment, and a glaring gap subsequently emerges in the incentivization of
outside actors to properly perform their gatekeeping role. Thus, the USA, as it is
widely adopted, creates a dangerous liability gap that inhibits the gatekeeping
function in securities transactions that demands rectification.
This Article focuses on this critical incongruity. Part I closely examines the
gatekeeping role, addresses the Uniform Securities Act in the realm of civil lia-
bility, and explores its construction of primary and secondary liability. More
specifically, Part I examines how changes in federal law have created a regulato-
ry abyss for certain secondary (or collateral) actors. Part II addresses variations
in the adoption of the USA among certain states as it relates to secondary liabil-
ity and discusses non-USA approaches adopted by other states. Part III assesses
the different ways in which courts have dealt with collateral participants under
the USA, including classification as employees, agents, or control persons. Fi-
nally, Part IV focuses on the risk to investors in securities transactions, ethical
concerns, and inadequate encouragement of outside gatekeepers as a result of
the USA. The Article concludes by proposing meaningful solutions to address
the current liability abyss.
I. THE GATEKEEPING FUNCTION
Gatekeepers are reputational intermediaries that, in the securities context,
enhance market integrity by staking their reputation on the credibility of an in-
vestment through their certification, assessment, or verification of facts sur-
leges facts that, if true, would make the Mayer Brown Defendants guilty of aiding
and abetting the securities fraud that harmed the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court
and Congress have declined to provide a private right of action for victims of secu-
rities fraud against those who merely-if otherwise substantially and culpably-
aid a fraud that is executed by others. Accordingly, the motions to dismiss must be
granted."). In a footnote of the case quoted above, Judge Lynch of the Southern
District of New York commented:
It is perhaps dismaying that participants in a fraudulent scheme who may
even have committed criminal acts are not answerable in damages to the
victims of the fraud. However ... the fact that the plaintiff-investors have
no claim is the result of a policy choice by Congress. In 1995, in reaction
to the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank, Congress authorized
the SEC-but not private parties-to bring enforcement actions against
those who "knowingly provide [ ] substantial assistance to another per-
son" in violation of the federal securities laws. This choice may be ripe
for legislative re-examination. While the impulse to protect professionals
and other marginal actors who may too easily be drawn into securities
litigation may well be sound, a bright line between principals and ac-
complices may not be appropriate.
Refco, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 318 n.15 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, lo9 Stat.
737, 757 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 7 8t(f) (2012)).
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rounding it.' Depending on the circumstances, gatekeepers have the ability to
detect and deter fraud.' Gatekeeper reliability is thus an integral component of
the integrity of securities markets.
The need to properly motivate effective gatekeeper functioning cannot be
overemphasized. Consistent with their client engagements, gatekeepers assess
the integrity and transparency of a corporation's offering of securities.o For ex-
ample, gatekeepers may function to reduce the risk of harm to investors by re-
fusing to provide services." The gatekeeper's position as the red or green light to
the consummation of securities transactions is often superior to the after-the-
fact remedies provided by investor lawsuits and government enforcement pro-
ceedings." Gatekeeping thus has the realistic potential to prevent systemic
frauds such as those perpetrated by Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia, Baptist
Foundation of Arizona, and Radical Bunny.13
8. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1296. See generally sources cited supra note 2.
9. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1170-71 (2014) ("Emphasizing the importance
of outside professionals as 'gatekeepers who detect and deter fraud,' the Senate
Report concludes: 'Congress must reconsider the incentive system that has been
set up that encourages accountants and lawyers who come across fraud in their
work to remain silent."' (quoting S. REP. No. 107-146, at 2 (2002))).
10. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 962 (N.Y. 2010) ("There can be little
doubt that the role played by auditors and other gatekeepers serves the public as
well as the corporations that contract for such services. Investors rely heavily on
information prepared by or approved by auditors, accountants, and other gate-
keeper professionals. Corporate financial statements, examined by ostensibly in-
dependent auditors, 'are one of the primary sources of information available to
guide the decisions of the investing public."' (quoting United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 810-11 (1984))).
ni. See generally Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1170-71 (noting the role of gatekeepers in detect-
ing and deterring fraud); see also Kraakman, supra note 2, at 888-98 (explaining
the incentives and duties of gatekeepers).
12. See SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Benjamin, 328
F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964); SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682,
689 (D.D.C. 1978); In the Matter of Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act Release No.
17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981); see
also Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 83 (2003) ("Gate-
keepers can often take a variety of steps to prevent their clients from acting unlaw-
fully. Gatekeepers can screen prospective clients prior to selling them a product or
offering them a service. They may also be positioned to observe client conduct and
prevent wrongdoing from taking place."); Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers,
41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2004) ("Lawyers are gatekeepers and always have
been."); Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169,
2245 (2004) ("By withholding his or her support (such as a lawyer's opinion letter
or an accountant's certification), the professional gatekeeper may be able to pre-
vent the fraud.").
13. In each of these cases of large-scale fraud, attorneys and accountants allegedly
failed to effectively perform their gatekeeping functions; they failed to minimize,
5
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Most often, corporate scandals involve multitudes of potential gatekeepers
who do not adequately respond, leading to enormous investor financial losses
and hardship. 1 4 As Judge Stanley Sporkin, former Director of the Division of
Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and former
General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, asserted:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now asserting
their rights under the Fifth Amendment, when these clearly improper
transactions were being consummated? Why didn't any of them speak
up or disassociate themselves from the transactions? Where also were
the outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions were ef-
fectuated? What is difficult to understand is that with all the profes-
sional talent involved (both accounting and legal) why at least one pro-
fessional would not have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching
that took place in this case.'
These types of scandals are harmful to the reputation of outside profession-
als as well as monetarily damaging in jurisdictions where outside professionals
are vulnerable to liability under applicable state securities and common law. For
let alone prevent, the violations by alerting the investing public or regulators. See,
e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
("The Underwriter Defendants contend that... they were entitled to rely on An-
dersen's comfort letters for WorldCom's unaudited interim financial stateme-
nts . . . ."); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549,
567 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (law firm, Vinson and Elkins, and accounting firm, Arthur
Andersen, sued for misrepresentations that allowed the scandal to continue); ac-
cord, In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
Facciola v. Greenberg Traurig LLP, No. CV-lo-1o25-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 2268950(D. Ariz. June 9, 2011); In re Adelphia Comm'ns. Corp. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No.
04 Civ. 3961, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91584 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2010).
14. In the Baptist Foundation of Arizona (BFA) scandal, for example, the amount due
to investors, many of whom were elderly, at the time of the organization's bank-
ruptcy was approximately $590 million. One of the authors of this Article (Marc I.
Steinberg) served as an expert witness in this litigation. From at least the mid-
1980s through July 1999, BFA offered and sold securities to investors located in Ar-
izona and throughout the United States and several foreign countries. According
to the Arizona Corporations Commission, a fraud of that size and length of time
could not have occurred without the outside auditor, Arthur Andersen, "knowing-
ly or recklessly ignoring the repeated warnings, or 'red flags' uncovered during its
audits." In the Matter of Arthur Andersen LLP, No. S-o3386A-oo-OOOO, 2000 WL
35730980, at *4-7 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n Sept. 27, 2000); see also Christine E. Earley
et al., Some Thoughts on the Audit Failure at Enron, the Demise ofAndersen, and the
Ethical Climate of Public Accounting Firms, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1013, 1020-21 (2003)
(noting the BPA fraud "was uncovered by a folksy CPA in Phoenix ... [who] dis-
covered the foundation's insolvency in basically one afternoon worth of work-
humbly attributing her skills as 'Accounting loi, Auditing oi"').
15. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990).
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example, the law firm that served as counsel to the Baptist Foundation was
sued, settling the lawsuit for over $20 million."S Even more astounding, the ac-
counting firm for the Baptist Foundation, Arthur Andersen, agreed to a settle-
ment of over $2oo million." More recently, the outside law firms for Radical
Bunny and Mortgages Limited settled litigation for $88 million." These scan-
dals, which occurred in states such as Arizona and Texas that have not adopted
the USA and thus allow for secondary liability for outside professionals, under-
score the need to incentivize proper gatekeeping behavior by collateral actors.
While these massive corporate scandals led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002,'" the legislation fails to adequately address a recurring scenario: the
gatekeeping functions of collateral actors. In the securities offering context,
gatekeeper functioning likely would improve by placing a burden on all collat-
eral actors who materially aid a violation to show that they had exercised rea-
sonable care.2
The role that gatekeepers play in the securities markets has been widely rec-
ognized by the courts.21 It is, therefore, even more troubling that the gatekeep-
16. Floyd Norris, $217 Million New Settlement by Andersen in Baptist Case, N.Y. TIMES
(May 7, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/o5/o7/business/217-million-new-
settlement-by-andersen-in-baptist-case.html [http://perma.cc/2DMM-NATG]
(reporting an estimated $350 million lost by investors, excluding interest, and that
inside counsel for the foundation was indicted on fraud charges); Art Toalston,
Law Firm Settlement Recovers $2iM for Foundation Investors, BAPTIST PRESS (May
16, 2002), http://www.bpnews.net/1339o/law-firm-settlement-recoverS-21m-for-
foundation-investors [http://perma.cc/9SAA-8Z7C].
17. Norris, supra note 16. In addition to the large monetary component, the Andersen
partner in charge of the audit as well as the manager of the audit agreed to give up
their licenses to practice accounting in Arizona.
18. Nate Raymond, Law Firms To Pay $88 Mln in Case Related to Mortgage Crisis,
REUTERS (June 21, 2012, 2:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/greenberg-
quarles-classaction-idUSLIE8HLB652012o621 [http://perma.cc/JC6B-D5WJ];
Debra Cassens Weiss, Greenberg Traurig, Quarles To Pay $88M To Settle Suit by
Mortgage Investors, A.B.A. J. (June 22, 2012, 11:34 AM), http://www.abajournal
.com/news/article/greenberg-traurig-quarlesto-pay_88mto-settle-suitby.mor
tgage-investors [http://perma.cc/SKL4-7FHD]. One of the authors of this Article
(Marc I. Steinberg) served as an expert witness in this litigation.
19. 107 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of n1, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C.); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-113, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12,
15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
20. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2005); see also Sung Hui Kim,
Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 415 (2008); Kraakman, supra
note 2, at 888-98.
21. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting the im-
portance of attorneys in serving the public as gatekeepers in securities transac-
tions); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Inde-
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ing role of outside advisers is slighted under the USA's secondary liability provi-
sions. As the Second Circuit has observed: while "[tihe securities laws provide a
myriad of safeguards designed to protect the interests of the investing public[,]
[e]ffective implementation of these safeguards... depends in large measure on
the members of the bar who serve in an advisory capacity to those engaged in
securities transactions."" In the same decision, issued over four decades ago,
the court voiced its disagreement with the premise that aider and abettor liabil-
ity should not attach if an actor was simply "engaging in customary business
practices," such as providing legal advice.2 3 Instead, the Second Circuit em-
braced the gatekeeping function, asserting that "[tihe public trust demands
more of its legal advisers than 'customary' activities which prove to be care-
less." 4 Without the specter of private securities liability exposure, these higher
pendent auditors serve a crucial role in the functioning of world capital markets
because they are reputational intermediaries. In certifying a company's financial
statements, their reputations for independence and probity signal the accuracy of
the information disclosed by the company, the managers of which typically are
unknown to most of the investing public."); Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743
F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (discussing the failure of gatekeepers to adequately
perform their role in the case at issue); sources cited supra note ii.
22. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d at 536. The court further stated that "[t]he legal profession
plays a unique and pivotal role in the effective implementation of the securities
laws. Questions of compliance with the intricate provisions of these statutes are
ever present and the smooth functioning of the securities markets will be seriously
disturbed if the public cannot rely on the expertise proffered by an attorney when
he renders an opinion on such matters." Id. at 541-42.
23. Id. at 542 ("We do not find persuasive the argument by one recent commentator
that since 'the alleged aider and abettor will merely be engaging in customary
business activities, such as loaning money, managing a corporation, preparing fi-
nancial statements, distributing press releases, completing brokerage transactions,
or giving legal advice, [a requirement that he] investigate the ultimate activities of
the party whom he is assisting [may impose] a burden ... upon business activities
that is too great.' In the distribution of unregistered securities, the preparation of
an opinion letter is too essential and the reliance of the public too high to permit
due diligence to be cast aside in the name of convenience." (quoting David S. Rud-
er, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Con-
spiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597,
632-33 (1972)).
24. Id.; see also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 963 (N.Y. 2010) (Ciparick, J.,
dissenting) (noting the important policy concerns regarding gatekeeper incentives
and warning that immunizing gatekeeper professionals "merely invite[s] gatekeep-
er professionals 'to neglect their duty to ferret out fraud by corporate insiders be-
cause even if they are negligent, there will be no damages assessed against them for
their malfeasance"' (quoting Adam Pritchard, O'Melveny Meyers v. FDIC: Impu-
tation of Fraud and Optimal Monitoring, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 179, 192 (1995))); In
re Fields, Exchange Act Release No. 5404, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
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expectations for those in the position to prevent or minimize harm are signifi-
cantly undermined.
Because a gatekeeper's leverage lies in his or her ability to help prevent
widespread wrongdoing by withholding cooperation, cost-effective motivation
to withhold services is essential. A successful gatekeeping regime must include
sufficient deterrence through meaningful enforcement mechanisms." Although
enforcement mechanisms do currently exist by way of government enforcement
and private causes of action,26 the effectiveness of these mechanisms is insuffi-
cient when outside advisers behave negligently.
Moreover, an ethical dilemma results for accountants and lawyers who are
positioned to undertake a gatekeeping role. For example, with respect to law-
yers, under the rules of professional conduct, "a lawyer is not privileged to un-
thinkingly permit himself to be co-opted into an ongoing fraud and cast as a
dupe or a shield for a wrong-doing client."" Similarly, SEC Rule 102(e) pro-
vides for the suspension of an accountant from practicing or appearing before
the Commission for violating professional standards through specific acts of
negligent conduct."8 And yet despite professional standards, outside profession-
als-beyond the reach of the USA-find themselves insulated from private se-
curities liability for just such unthinkingly negligent behavior.29
25. See Kim, supra note 20, at 415 (describing the key components of a successful gate-
keeping regime as: "(1) a gatekeeper-someone 'who can and will prevent miscon-
duct reliably,' (2) a gate-some service which the wrongdoer needs to accomplish
his goal, and (3) a law enforcement mechanism-an enforceable duty-that obli-
gates private parties to take some action aimed at averting misconduct when de-
tected").
26. For instance, increased obligations for attorneys exist under the Sarbanes-Oxley
regime. See also infra notes 32-50 and accompanying text (discussing the other
causes of actions available in regard to gatekeepers and other collateral actors).
27. In the Matter of Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
28. SEC Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2016). Rule 102(e) is now codified as Section 4C
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78d- 3 (2012). See Dearlove v. SEC, 573
F.3d 801, 804 (2009) (upholding the disbarment of an accountant from practicing
before the Commission because he violated the Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards (GAAS)); Securities Act Release No. 7593, 68 SEC Docket 489 (Oct. 19,
1998); MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL &
STATE ENFORCEMENT § 4:3 (2d ed. 2001, 2016-2017 supp.). Attorneys also are sub-
ject to discipline under Rule 102(e). See, e.g., SEC v. Altman, 666 F-3d 1322 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (attorney disciplined for engaging in unethical conduct).
29. See, e.g., Bennett v. Durham, 683 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding attorney not
liable under Kentucky securities law despite allegations that he knowingly drafted
misleading documents).
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II. THE REGULATORY GAP OUTSIDE THE USA
Absent liability under the state securities acts (also called "blue sky laws"),3 0
holding attorneys and other gatekeepers accountable for negligently assisting
unlawful securities transactions quickly becomes extremely onerous. Under the
USA, an individual who falls within the secondary liability provisions will be
held civilly liable in private actions unless that individual can sustain the burden
of proof "that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is al-
leged to exist."31 In theory, then, a collateral actor likewise may be subject to
private liability under the federal securities laws and common-law causes of ac-
tion. But, as explored in further detail below, changes in the law have largely
eliminated federal liability, and common-law causes of action entail increased
30. "Blue sky" laws refer to state statutes that regulate securities transactions. While
the origin of the term is not entirely clear, some have proffered that certain securi-
ties operators were so blatant in their schemes that they would "sell building lots
in the blue sky in fee simple." See Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Origin of the
Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 359 n.59 (1991). See generally Symposium, Blue
Sky Anniversary Edition, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 3 (2011) (commemorating the one
hundredth anniversary of the Kansas blue sky law, the first state law regulating the
sale of securities).
31. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1956). Liability is, of course, subject
to defenses such as a statute of limitations defense or an in pari delicto defense. For
example, in Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, the court stated: "The doctrine of in pari de-
licto mandates that the courts will not intercede to resolve a dispute between two
wrongdoers. This principle has been wrought in the inmost texture of our com-
mon law for at least two centuries." 938 N.E.2d 941, 950 (N.Y. 2010) (citing Wood-
worth v. Janes, 2 Johns. Cas. 417, 423 (N.Y. 1800)). The court held that a litigation
trustee, appointed to pursue causes of action possessed by the defrauding compa-
ny, which was now bankrupt, could not bring a claim against secondary actors
such as outside counsel and the outside accounting firm for fraud, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, and malpractice because it was barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto.
In so holding, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that the "adverse interest ex-
ception" applied. This exception holds that "where an officer acts entirely in his
own interests and adverse to the interests of the corporation, that misconduct
cannot be imputed to the corporation." Id.; see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622,
633 (1988) (examining the in pari delicto defense and explaining the defense is only
available under Section 12 of the Securities Act where "(i) as a direct result of his
own actions, the plaintiff bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the vi-
olations he seeks to redress, and (2) preclusion of suit would not significantly in-
terfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection of the
investing public"); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 301
(1985) (discussing the in pari delicto defense under Section lo(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act but deciding not to allow the defense in the case of tippers who
fraudulently induced investors to purchase securities by misrepresenting that they
were conveying material non-pubic information about the issuer). See generally
MARC I. STEINBERG & WILLIAM K.S. WANG, INSIDER TRADING § 4.1 (3d ed. 2010).
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requirements that limit their application. Thus, absent private collateral liability
under state securities law, a regulatory gap emerges.
A. Common Law Causes ofAction
A collateral participant who does not fall under the secondary liability pro-
visions of the USA nonetheless may be monetarily liable for such claims as
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and
aiding and abetting fraud.32 That said, each potential claim has significant limi-
tations.
Negligent misrepresentation, depending on the state, may have strict re-
quirements, such as demanding a relationship that is "near-privity"33 and a
showing of justifiable reliance3 4 by the complaining party. There have tradition-
ally been three approaches to negligent misrepresentation claims when applied
to outside auditors or professionals. 5 The most stringent approach requires
privity between the tortfeasor (the accountant or outside professional) and the
third party who was allegedly injured by the misrepresentation."6 On the other
32. See, e.g., NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG LLP, 901 A.2d 871 (N.J. 20o6); Cowburn v. Le-
ventis, 619 S.E.2d 437, 447-48 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005); In re Jack Greenberg, Inc., 240
B.R. 486, 523 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999). See generally MARC I. STEINBERG, ATTORNEY
LIABILITY AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY (2016).
33. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (holding that privity
or something close to it is required for negligent misrepresentation); Haddon
View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214 (Ohio 1982) (same);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1997); William L. Prosser,
Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231 (1966); Robert K. Wise &
Heather E. Poole, Negligent Misrepresentation in Texas: The Misunderstood Tort, 40
TEX. TECH L. REV. 845, 914-15 (2008).
34. See, e.g., Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291, 298 (Minn. 1976) (noting the require-
ment of justifiable reliance); Lucky 7, LLC v. THT Realty, LLC, 775 N.W.2d 671, 675
(Neb. 2009) (same); Silva v. Stevens, 589 A.2d 852, 860 (Vt. 1991) (same).
35. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 752 (Cal. 1992) (discussing the three
approaches and observing that "[t] he complex nature of the audit function and its
economic implications has resulted in different approaches to the question wheth-
er CPA auditors should be subjected to liability to third parties who read and rely
on audit reports. Although three schools of thought are commonly recognized,
there are some variations within each school and recent case law suggests a possi-
ble trend toward merger of two of the three approaches").
36. This approach was put forward famously in Ultramares Corp., 174 N.E. at 444. The
court explained its reasoning for such a high barrier as follows: "If liability for neg-
ligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery
beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The
hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle
doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to
these consequences." Id.
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end of the spectrum, some courts have provided that liability should be based
only on the foreseeability of injury to third persons." The last approach tracks
something of a middle course; that is, actors are exposed to liability when the
recipient of the representation has justifiably relied on the representation, but
this approach limits this liability exposure to loss suffered by a limited group of
persons for whom the information was intended to benefit or for whom guid-
ance was provided by the allegedly negligent party.38 This middle approach, es-
poused in the Second Restatement of Torts, is the most widely adopted, and it
significantly limits allegedly aggrieved parties from mounting a successful
claim."
Legal malpractice claims are similarly restrictive. Typically, only the client
of the subject attorney can bring a claim. 40 Legal malpractice and negligent mis-
representation are nonetheless distinguishable, as the federal district court in
the Enron litigation explained:
[L]iability for legal malpractice ... is based on 'the breach of a duty
that a professional owes his clients or others in privity,' [while] liability
for negligent misrepresentation ... is "based on an independent duty
to a nonclient based on the professional's manifest awareness of the
37. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 764; Howard Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified
Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 233, 260
(1983) ("Accountant liability based on foreseeable injury would serve the dual
functions of compensation for injury and deterrence of negligent conduct.").
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552.
39. See McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787,
792-94 (Tex. 1999) (noting "Section 552 is the most widely adopted standard of
negligent misrepresentation in attorney liability cases and economic negligence
cases generally" and explaining the limited applicability of section 552); see also,
e.g., Vogel v. Foth & Van Dyke Assocs., Inc., 266 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 2001) (ap-
plying Iowa law).
40. Hustler Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cambria, 625 F. App'x 712(6th Cir. 2015) (applying Ohio
law); Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Messera, 4 F. Supp. 2d 293,
298 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying New York law); Jennings v. Badgett, 230 P.3d 861,
866 (Okla. 2010). In some jurisdictions, third parties may also institute malpractice
actions when an attorney allegedly breaches a duty owed to them. See Essex Ins.
Co. v. Tyler, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1274 (D. Colo. 2004) (applying Colorado law
and discussing the policy reasons for generally limiting legal malpractice claims to
claims "grounded on the existence of an attorney-client relationship"); McCamish,
991 S.W.2d at 794. But see Century 21 Deep S. Props., Ltd. v. Corson, 612 SO. 2d 359,
374 (Miss. 1992) (holding that legal malpractice actions involving title work done
by an attorney do not require an attorney-client relationship, and "extend[ing] li-
ability to foreseeable third parties who detrimentally rely").
12
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nonclient's reliance on the misrepresentation and the professional's in-
tention that the nonclient so rely." 4 '
Accordingly, unless an allegedly aggrieved party can show that the attorney or
other professional owed a duty to her, a malpractice claim does not normally
lie. And this duty ordinarily cannot be shown when aggrieved investors seek to
sue outside professionals retained by the subject enterprise. 42
Likewise, to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim, plaintiffs must prove
that the subject professional owed this duty to them. 43 While corporate direc-
tors and officers generally owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and collec-
tively to the shareholders, 44 recognition of this duty to investors and other equi-
ty holders ordinarily is not imposed upon collateral participants such as
attorneys and accountants.45 Thus, proving that a fiduciary duty existed be-
tween investor-plaintiffs and these professionals is unlikely.46
41. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 608 (S.D.
Tex. 2002) (quoting McCarnish, 991 S.W.2d at 792) (applying Texas law), rev'd on
other grounds, 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007).
42. See, e.g., SMWNPF Holdings, Inc. v. Devore, 165 F-3d 360, 367 (5th Cir. 1999) (ap-
plying Texas law and finding no attorney-client relationship, and thus no legal
malpractice claim, in an investment transaction in which the other party to the
transaction was represented by an attorney, but the attorney performed services
for both parties to the transaction when preparing the closing document); Ban-
croft v. Kneipper, No. CA3-90-2754-D, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18790 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 30, 1992) (dismissing legal malpractice claims because attorney does not owe
duty directly to individual investors). Note that, because the subject attorney's cli-
ent is the affected company, a shareholder derivative action may be brought
against the attorney for alleged malpractice. Of course, derivative claims are sub-
ject to challenging procedural hurdles and any monetary recovery, after the award
of attorneys' fees and expenses, is paid to the company. See, e.g., MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT §§ 7.40-7-47 (2002) (AM. BAR Ass'N); infra note 50 and accompanying
text.
43. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, No. 10-612, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78162, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2010) (applying Pennsylvania law).
44. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 93o A.2d
92, 99 (Del. 2007) (citing Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); Guth v.
Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
45. In re Banks, 584 P.2d 284, 289 (Or. 1978) (en banc) ("The corporation usually is
considered an entity and the attorney's duty of loyalty is to the corporation and
not to its officers, directors or any particular group of stockholders." (citing
Meehan v. Hopps, 301 P.2d 10, 15 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956); U.S. Indus., Inc. v.
Goldman, 421 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y 1976); and Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi Bros., Inc., 32 Cal.
Rptr. 188 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963))); Lively v. Henderson, No. 14-05-01229-CV, 2007
Tex. App. LEXIS 8951, at *13 (Tex. App. 2007) (holding attorney owed no fiduciary
duty to shareholder because corporations were distinct from shareholders, even
when there is only one shareholder) (citing Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKee,
943 S.W.2d 455, 458 (Tex. 1997)); cf Eternal Pres. Assocs., LLC v. Accidental
Mummies Touring Co., LLC, 759 F. Supp. 2d 887, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (applying
13
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Claims based on fraud or aiding and abetting fraud also place significant
burdens upon an allegedly injured party, contributing to an overall regulatory
gap. 4 7 Because of the current USA language, outside professionals are insulated
from monetary liability in cases where this higher burden cannot be met. A
fraud claim requires proof of the requisite intent, reliance, loss causation, and
damages.48 An aider and abettor claim, moreover, has been interpreted to re-
Michigan law) ("An attorney who represents a closely held corporation and a con-
trolling shareholder may also have a fiduciary to the other shareholder [s].").
46. Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 500 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying Penn-
sylvania law) ("[A] plaintiff alleging a fiduciary breach must first demonstrate that
a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed, which requires that one person has
reposed a special confidence in another to the extent that the parties do not deal
with each other on equal terms. Although no precise formula has been devised to
ascertain the existence of a confidential relationship, it has been said that such a
relationship exists whenever one occupies toward another such a position of advi-
sor or counselor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in good faith
for the other's interest." (citations omitted)).
47. See infra notes 48-50.
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with par-
ticularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.").
The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
In order to properly assert a claim for fraud, the plaintiff must show the
following nine elements: (i) a representation; (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor ei-
ther (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had in-
sufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other par-
ty, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.
Additionally, rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
"[iun all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." This means that "a
complaint cannot survive dismissal by pleading mere conclusory allega-
tions unsupported... by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts." In
other words, "the mere recitation by a plaintiff of the elements of fraud
in a complaint does not satisfy the particularity requirement"-only "a
sufficiently clear and specific description of the facts underlying the
[plaintiff's] claim of [fraud] will satisfy the requirements of rule 9(b)."
Carlton v. Brown, 323 P-3d 571, 581-82 (Utah 2014) (citations omitted); see also Laz-
ar v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 981, 982 (Cal. 1996) (discussing the specificity need-
ed in pleading fraud claims); Cont'l Basketball Ass'n v. Ellenstein Enters. Inc., 669
N.E.2d 134, 138 (Ind. 1996) (same); Pocahontas Mining Co. Ltd. P'ship v. Oxy USA,
Inc., 503 S.E.2d 258, 263 (W. Va. 1998) (same). But see Rocker v. KPMG LLP, 148
P.3d 703, 704 (Nev. 20o6) (adopting a more relaxed pleading requirement under
the state's Rule 9(b), where the "facts necessary for the plaintiff to plead a cause of
action for fraud with particularity ... are peculiarly within the defendant's
14
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quire proof of actual intent.49 If a derivative suit were to be brought in this con-
text (where any monetary recovery goes to the subject corporation, after the
award of attorneys' fees and expenses), it likely would be dismissed because of
the onerous procedural hurdles, including the demand requirement and the use
of special litigation committees."o
The limitations of each of these common-law causes of action demonstrate
why they normally are less attractive than the state securities laws and explains
why these common-law causes of action fail to fill the regulatory gap for outside
professionals in securities transactions.
B. Collateral Liability, or Lack Thereof Under Federal Law
The private enforcement gap for secondary actors also prevails under the
federal securities laws. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that liability for aiders
and abettors is not available in private actions under Section io(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act and SEC Rule 1ob- 5 .' Additionally, more recent Supreme
Court decisions have significantly confined the reach of Section lo(b) and Rule-
lob-5 primary liability, thereby effectively insulating collateral actors from lia-
bility under these provisions in private actions." Moreover, the Private Securi-
knowledge or possession" and finding that "if the plaintiff pleads specific facts giv-
ing rise to an inference of fraud, the plaintiff should have an opportunity to con-
duct discovery and amend his complaint to include the particular facts").
49. See, e.g., Eurycleia Partners, LP v. Seward & Kissel, LLP, 910 N.E.2d 976, 979 (N.Y.
2009).
50. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); Marc I. Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Com-
mittees To Terminate Shareholder Derivative Suits, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1980).
Moreover, the PSLRA requires that plaintiffs state with particularity both the facts
constituting an alleged securities violation and the facts showing scienter-which
is the intention to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Is-
sues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007); see also infra note 53 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the PSLRA).
51. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994) (holding that § io(b) does not provide for aider and abettor liability in pri-
vate actions). Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, secondary liability in federal
cases was well accepted by the federal appellate courts. See id. at 192 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("In hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every Cir-
cuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded that aiders and
abettors are subject to liability under § io(b) and Rule iob-5."); Farlow v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (loth Cir. 1992); Barker v. Henderson,
Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7 th Cir. 1986). See generally Marc I.
Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal Secu-
rities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557 (1982).
52. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011);
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). In Janus,
the court held that primary liability for a misleading statement under Rule lob-
15
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ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) requires that plaintiffs adequately
plead both the facts constituting an alleged securities violation and the facts
showing scienter, that is, the intention to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
Control person liability under Section 15 of the Securities Act and Section 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act also has limited applicability due to the fact that
these provisions so rarely reach collateral actors.5 4 Moreover, the Supreme
5(b) can only attach to the maker of the statement, defined as the one who has ul-
timate authority over the statement. The court stated:
For purposes of Rule iob-5, the maker of a statement is the person or en-
tity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and
whether and how to communicate it. Without control, a person or entity
can merely suggest what to say, not "make" a statement in its own right.
One who prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its
maker. And in the ordinary case, attribution within a statement or im-
plicit from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a state-
ment was made by-and only by-the party to whom it is attributed.
Janus, 564 U.S. at 142-43. In Stoneridge, the Court held that secondary actors in
securities transactions could not be found primarily liable under the "scheme lia-
bility" theory as espoused in that case. 552 U.S. at 149. Respondents, suppliers to
the subject corporation, were held not primarily liable for entering into arrange-
ments with the corporation for the alleged known purpose of allowing the corpo-
ration to mislead its auditors and thereby issue misleading financial statements to
inflate its stock price. No primary Section io(b) liability existed, according to the
Court, because the respondent's conduct was not relied upon by the plaintiffs in
making stock purchase decisions. Id. at 166-67.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012) ("[T]he complaint shall specify each statement alleged
to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,
and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information
and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief
is formed.... [T]he complaint shall... state with particularity facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."); see
also Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314. In Tellabs, interpreting the "strong inference" language
of the PSLRA, the Court stated that "to determine whether a complaint's scienter
allegations can survive threshold inspection for sufficiency, a court governed by
[the PSLRA] must engage in a comparative evaluation; it must consider, not only
inferences urged by the plaintiff... but also competing inferences rationally
drawn from the facts alleged." Id. The Court held that "an inference of scienter
must be more than merely plausible or reasonable-it must be cogent and at least
as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent." Id.
54. See, e.g., Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1270 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding attorney
not liable as "controlling person" unless "significantly probative evidence" exists
showing "direct or indirect" control amounting to "meaningful hegemony" over
the enterprise by attorney or law firm); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 209 n.28 (1976) (holding that the control person provision in Section
20(a) "contains a state-of-mind condition requiring something more than negli-
gence"). Section 15 of the Securities Act imposes liability on a person that controls
a person liable under Section ii or 12. No liability attaches if "the controlling per-
16
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Court in Pinter v. Dahl,55 while not imposing a strict vendor-purchaser privity
requirement, defined the term "seller" under Section 12(1) (today Section
12(a)(1)) of the Securities Act so as to preclude liability for collateral actors. As
the Court reasoned, "§ 12's failure to impose express liability for mere participa-
tion in unlawful sales transactions suggests that Congress did not intend that
the section impose liability on participants collateral to the offer or sale.""'
Due to these Supreme Court holdings, avenues for recovery for investors
from those who substantially participated in the violations, but were only col-
lateral actors, have been effectively eliminated at the federal level." Today, ag-
grieved plaintiffs are usually forced to resort to state law remedies when pursu-
ing secondary actors.58 Most states have adopted the Uniform Securities Act,
son acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action." 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2012).
55. 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
56. Id. at 650-51 (deciding not to adopt the broader substantial factor test adhered to
by some jurisdictions, and noting that "although the substantial-factor test un-
doubtedly embraces persons who pass title and who solicit the purchase of unreg-
istered securities as statutory sellers, the test also would extend § 12(1) liability to
participants only remotely related to the relevant aspects of the sales transaction.
Indeed, it might expose securities professionals, such as accountants and lawyers,
whose involvement is only the performance of their professional services, to
§ 12(1) strict liability for rescission. The buyer does not, in any meaningful sense,
'purchas[e] the security' from 'such a person."'); see also Wilson v. Saintine Expl. &
Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding law firm not a seller under
5 12(2)). See generally Mark Klock, Promoter Liability and In Pari Delicto Under
Section 12(1): Pinter v. Dahl, 17 SEC. REG. L.J. 53 (1989).
57. Liability still exists in a limited fashion, as discussed in the preceding paragraph,
for "control persons" under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Section 15 of
the Securities Act, but such persons are rarely collateral actors.
58. Recovery under state law has also been eliminated in many situations due to the
passage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) that,
with certain exceptions, preempts private class actions involving nationally traded
securities. These state class actions are preempted by federal law. SLUSA was
passed in response to plaintiffs attempting to bypass the disadvantages, including
stricter pleading requirements and a stay on discovery pending a motion to dis-
miss, imposed on federal securities class action suits by the PSLRA. See Chad-
bourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (2014) (interpreting the scope
of SLUSA); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86
(20o6) (discussing the purpose behind SLUSA, specifically to prevent plaintiffs
from frustrating the objectives of the PSLRA); In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 308
F. Supp. 2d 236, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Faced with the hurdles presented by the
PSLRA, claimants simply abandoned federal court and filed suit in state court, al-
leging state securities law claims." (citing Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins.
Co., 251 F.3d 1o, 107-08 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2001))). See generally MARC I. STEINBERG,
SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 9.o6 (2015).
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which, as outlined above, allows for secondary liability in certain situations but
contains glaring holes.
III. INEQUALITY IN LANGUAGE: THE REGULATORY GAP WITHIN THE USA
Section 410 of the USA, which sets forth private civil liability regarding the
offer or sale of securities, results in unequal exposure to liability between in-
house and outside actors. Section 410 provides for primary liability for the seller
and secondary liability for certain parties, and has become increasingly im-
portant for plaintiffs in private securities litigation as decisions by the Supreme
Court have eliminated aider and abettor liability under Section io(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act and drastically confined the reach of primary liability for
collateral actors. 9 Section 4 1o(b) enumerates the categories of persons other
than a seller who can be held liable:
(b) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under
subsection (a), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, every
person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, eve-
ry employee of such a seller who materially aids in the sale, and every
broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale are also liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller, unless the
non-seller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.
There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons
so liable."o
An outside accountant, attorney, or consultant performing traditional functions
does not, absent additional actions or relationships to the seller, fall within the
scope of Section 410(b)."
59. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011) (restrict-
ing further the application of § io(b) by holding that only the person or entity with
ultimate authority over a statement is a maker of the statement under Rule lob-
5(b)); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (hold-
ing that collateral actors could not be held liable as § lo(b) primary violators under
the "scheme" theory of liability presented at bar because of a lack of reliance);
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (elim-
inating aiding and abetting liability for private litigants under § io(b) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act).
6o. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1956) (emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., Bennett v. Durham, 683 F-3d 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (interpreting Kentucky
securities law); Ackerman v. Schwartz, 733 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991); Baker, Watts &
Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 62o A.2d 356, 368 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993). When per-
forming traditional legal functions, an outside lawyer will not fall into any of the
enumerated categories listed in USA § 410(b).
18
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On the other hand, inside counsel and other in-house professionals fall
within the liability net as employees of a seller if they materially aid in a sale."
This uneven application set forth in the Uniform Securities Act's language,
which allows for liability for inside professionals as employees while not reach-
ing outside professionals, raises serious ethical and liability concerns because
outside professionals (including outside legal counsel) are able to escape private
civil liability under the Act and, thus, may be less incentivized to engage actively
in their gatekeeping functions. This disparate treatment is illogical both from
corporate governance and law compliance perspectives.6 3
Clearly, the impact of this disparity extends beyond outside attorneys. The
same problems exist with any outside actor, including accountants, financial
analysts, and consultants. Indeed, the gap arises wherever individuals are re-
tained to perform services in connection with a securities transaction, but not
hired as employees. In fact, the gap is likely to become even more problematic
in the wake of increasing corporate contracting with outside vendors to procure
temporary personnel. 64 This lack of private securities liability for these "outside
actors," who often are well-positioned to recognize and prevent fraudulent ac-
tion, raises substantial ethical and public policy concerns.
A relatively recent Sixth Circuit case illustrates this civil liability disparity
under the USA. In Bennett v. Durham,5 outside counsel was found, as a matter
62. An enterprise's chief legal officer or general counsel also would be subject to liabil-
ity under Section 410(b) as an "officer" if conferred that status. Note that the terms
"inside" and "in-house" are used interchangeably in this Article, signifying that the
individual is an employee of the subject enterprise. See supra note 6.
63. No justifiable reason exists for distinguishing outside attorneys or auditors from
inside attorneys or auditors. Both groups perform the same functions and have ac-
cess to similar information to enable them to serve as gatekeepers. See MARC I.
STEINBERG & STEPHEN B. YEAGER, INSIDE COUNSEL: PRACTICES, STRATEGIES, AND
INSIGHTS (2015).
64. See Christopher S. Rugaber, Temporary Jobs Becoming a Permanent Fixture, USA
TODAY (July 7, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/o7/
o7/temporary-jobs-becoming-permanent-fixture/2496585/ [http://perma.cc/
MBZ5-LQ8G] (discussing the trend towards increased use of temporary and con-
tract labor and noting that "[t] he use of temps has extended into sectors that sel-
dom used them in the past-professional services, for example, which include
lawyers, doctors and information technology specialists"). Certain companies spe-
cialize in providing temporary, contract, or interim executives. For example, The
Brenner Group specializes in providing outsourced finance and accounting help
through temporary and interim CFOs and Controllers. See Interim Management
Overview, BRENNER GROUP, http://www.thebrennergroup.com/interim-
management [http:// perma.cc/8A9C-MHLS]. As another example, Cerius Execu-
tives provides all types of high-level executives on a contract basis. See About Us,
CERIUS EXECUTIVEs, http://ceriusexecutives.com/ [http://perma.cc/S5SH-PRRM].
65. 683 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2012).
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of law, not liable under Kentucky's blue sky law. 6 The court, citing U.S. Su-
preme Court authority"' and applying common understanding,6 8 held that the
outside attorney Durham was not a "seller" under the state statute because,
even though he drafted the offering memorandum and made himself available
to speak with clients, he had not solicited the purchases. 69 Moreover, the Ben-
nett court held that Durham was not secondarily liable because he was not a
partner, director, or officer of the enterprise; neither was he an "agent" as that
term is used in the USA.70 Since Durham fell under no other category that sub-
66. Id. at 735 (interpreting Kentucky Revised Statutes sections 92.480(1) and (4)). Ken-
tucky's blue sky law provides:
(i) Any person, who offers or sells a security in violation of this chap-
ter .... or offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact. . . , and who does
not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth or omission[,] is
liable to the person buying the security from him....
(4) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or purchaser
liable under subsection (1) or (2) of this section, every partner, officer, or
director (or other person occupying a similar status or performing simi-
lar functions) or employee of a seller or purchaser who materially aids in
the sale or purchase, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially
aids in the sale or purchase is also liable jointly and severally with and to
the same extent as the seller or purchaser, unless [he] sustains the burden
of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which
the liability is alleged to exist.
KY. REv. STAT. § 92.480(1), (4) (2016).
67. Bennett, 683 F.3d at 737 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988)). Pinter held that
the definition of "seller" under Section 12(1) (now § 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act of
1933) "extends only to a broker or other person who successfully solicits a purchase
of securities, so long as he is motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own
financial interests or those of the securities owner." 486 U.S. at 647. In reaching
this conclusion, the Pinter Court rejected the broader "substantial factor" test
adopted previously by some courts that defined the term seller as one whose par-
ticipation in the transaction is a substantial factor in causing the transaction to
take place. Id. at 655.
68. Customary understanding of the term "seller" generally entails an actor who actu-
ally sells or offers to sell, as opposed to the broader definition of seller laid out in
Pinter, discussed in supra note 67 and accompanying text.
69. Bennett, 683 F.3d at 736 ("The client and its broker-dealers sell the securities.
Durham no more 'offered' or 'sold' these securities than the lawyer representing
Magic Johnson's investment group recently 'bought' the Los Angeles Dodgers.").
70. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text discussing interpretation of attor-
neys as agents by states that have adopted the USA; see also Bennett, 683 F.3d at 740
("An attorney who performs ordinary legal work, such as drafting documents, giv-
20
35: 1 2016
FROM THE REGULATORY ABYSS: THE WEAKENED GATEKEEPING INCENTIVES UNDER THE USA
jected him to liability exposure under the statute, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the action.71
While this case, discussed further below," represents the prevailing view
adopted by courts across the country, the Sixth Circuit recognized the internal
contradiction in the USA-that is, that it fails to reach the knowing misconduct
of outside counsel. Nonetheless, the court swept the disparity aside, observing
that in some situations outside counsel would be subject to liability exposure
under other causes of action:
The ... factual allegations [include] that Durham served as an attorney
to Heartland and Mammoth on many different occasions, that he knew
the securities sales were illegal, and that Heartland's executives "relied
completely" on his advice.... A lawyer does not become something
other than a lawyer by serving the same client multiple times. Still less
is that the case because the client follows his advice unquestioningly or
because he knowingly drafts false or misleading documents. Of course,
an attorney who knowingly drafted false or misleading documents
would face other problems. He might be liable for fraud.... [o]r he
might be liable for malpractice or face disciplinary proceedings.73
However, as discussed supra, the other civil liability ramifications that may en-
sue do not fill the gap left open by the current statutory framework.74
The plain language of the USA provides that only specified enumerated
parties may be held liable, including the issuer, its officers and directors, and
certain collateral parties, such as agents or employees of the seller who material-
ly aid in the sale. Many states have looked to federal law when defining who
qualifies as a seller." Accordingly, outside professionals will not fall under the
umbrella of "seller" for purposes of the Act, unless they solicit the purchaser to
buy the subject security for financial gain.76 In states that have enacted the USA,
ing advice and answering client questions, is not an 'agent' under Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 292.480(4). Even if we accept all of the facts alleged in the complaint, that is all
Durham did.").
71. Bennett, 683 F.3d at 740.
72. See supra notes 32-50 and infra note 131 and accompanying text.
73. Bennett, 683 F.3d at 737-38.
74. See supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Bennett, 683 F.3d at 737 (applying Kentucky law and noting that "[s]ince
Pinter,... other state courts have construed their own blue-sky laws the same
way" as the Supreme Court); Highland Capital Mgmt., LP v. Ryder Scott Co., 402
S.W.3d 719, 741 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (interpreting "seller" consistent with federal
law and stating "Texas courts generally cite decisions of the federal courts to inter-
pret the [Texas Securities Act]").
76. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 644-47 (1988) (limiting "seller" to one who is the
vendor, the vendor's agent, or who solicits the transaction for financial gain to
himself or the vendor).
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therefore, the only way to hold actors accountable in private litigation under
that Act based on their assistance in perpetrating a securities violation alone-
i.e., without engaging in solicitation-is secondarily under Section 410(b). 7
State "blue sky" laws tend to adopt some form of the USA. There are three
versions of the Act-the 1956 original version and two revisions that followed in
1985 and 2002.7' The 1985 revision, which is commonly referred to as the Re-
vised Uniform Securities Act (RUSA), is not widely enacted.79 The original ver-
sion is the most commonly adopted, with a number of states enacting all or
most of it, although a number of these states have subsequently adopted the
2002 version at least in part.So That all said, the case law predominately con-
strues the 1956 Act" and the language of this version is, accordingly, the focus of
this Article.
Notably, the 2002 Act expanded secondary liability to include "an individu-
al who is an employee of or associated with a person liable under subsections (b)
through (f)" and who materially aids the conduct giving rise to the liabil-
ity ... ."14 Unfortunately, nothing in the official comments expands on or clari-
fies this change and no case law exists, thus far, interpreting the added term." It
77. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1956).
78. See Uniform Securities Act, supra note 5, at 1.
79. According to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
only six states enacted RUSA. Securities Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Securities%2oAct
[http://perma.cc/T4YN-EVAS].
80. U.S. Survey: State Adoption of Uniform Securities Act as of June 15, 2012, NAT'L ASS'N
FIXED ANNUITIES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.nafa.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2012/07/20120920-NAFA-Uniform-Security-Act-AdoptionAt-A-Glance.pdf
[http://perma.cc/832H-JNL9].
81. State v. Casper, 297 S.W. 3 d 676, 685 (Tenn. 2009) (noting that the majority of
states adopted the 1956 Act).
82. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 509(e). Interestingly, the 2002 Act made certain revisions includ-
ing adding persons who are investment advisers or representatives to those poten-
tially liable as well as anyone who was paid to give investment advice. See id.
83. Persons liable in sections (b) through (f) include: a person that buys or sells a se-
curity in violation of the Act, a person acting as a broker-dealer or agent that buys
or sells a security in violation of the Act, a person acting as an investment adviser
or investment adviser representative that provides advice regarding securities for
compensation in violation of the Act, or a person that receives directly or indirect-
ly any consideration for providing investment advice regarding securities and em-
ploys a scheme or attempts to defraud regarding the securities. Id. § 5o9(b)-(f).
84. Id. § 509(g)(3) (emphasis added).
85. See generally UNIF. SEC. ACT; Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities
Fraud: Gatekeepers in State Court, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 463, 483 (2011) ("The 2002
USA extends secondary liability beyond agents and employees to persons 'associ-
ated with' the issuer who materially aid in the sale. Nothing in the official com-
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could be argued that this additional language covers outside professionals in
addition to employees, but this view has not been adopted by any court thus far.
Furthermore, the broad nature of the language is arguably ambiguous and
might lead to overbroad and disparate application. Significantly, each of the re-
vised Acts allows for an affirmative defense if the "non-seller who is so liable
sustains the burden of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability is alleged to exist."" The USA also requires a showing of a primary vio-
lation by the issuer or other primary actor before aider liability can be im-
posed. Such requirements minimize the imposition of undue liability on sub-
ject defendants and deter abuse of the securities laws by potential plaintiffs.
IV. VARIANT APPROACHES TO THE USA
Blue sky laws do not universally adopt the original 1956 version of the USA;
but rather, there remains significant variation among the states as to exactly
how secondary liability is addressed. Understanding these diverse approaches to
collateral liability is key to reaching a solution concerning the current outside
gatekeeper regulatory gap. This solution seeks to effectively promote investor
ments, however, explains this addition and at present, there is no precedent ex-
plaining the term 'associated with."'). Interestingly, South Carolina altered its
adoption of the Act by removing the "associated with" language and adding lan-
guage so that the statute reads: "an individual who is an employee, or occupying a
similar status or performing a similar purpose." This language arguably would en-
compass outside actors, such as accountants, bankers, and lawyers. According to
the South Carolina Reporter Comments, this "change was made to eliminate an
interpretation of the 'associated with' language as creating an unintended 'aider
and abettor' liability." See South Carolina Reporter Comments, S.C. CODE ANN. §
35-1-509(g)(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
86. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 509(g)(3) (amended 2002); REVISED UNIF. SEC. ACT § 605(d)
(1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b). The only difference of note in the 2002 Act is that
the word "facts" is changed to "conduct," an interesting alteration but beyond the
scope of this Article.
87. In re Inv'rs Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("The
imposition of aider and abettor liability requires the establishment of three ele-
ments: (1) the existence of a primary violation, (2) the defendant's knowledge of
the primary violation, and (3) the defendant's knowing rendition of substantial as-
sistance to the violator."); Kirchoff v. Selby, 703 N.E.2d 644, 652 f-7 (Ind. 1998)
(comparing state and federal aider and abettor requirements); see also Marc I.
Steinberg & Chris Claassen, Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws:
Landscapes and Minefields, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 15-16 (2005) ("Secondary liability
under the state securities acts is derivative: if the seller cannot be held liable, then
the non-seller is not liable. Consequently, secondary actors can be liable to the
same extent as the primary violator. States are divided on whether this limitation
requires a primary violator to be held liable and whether it requires a plaintiff to
bring an action against the primary violator.").
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protection, prevent disparate treatment of in-house and outside personnel, and
protect the integrity of the securities markets, while also maintaining practicali-
ty in today's legislative environment. Any proposed changes to the current lan-
guage of the USA must be assessed in the context of these variations in Blue sky
laws across the country.
California, Florida, and Texas are three major states that have not adopted
the Uniform Securities Act. The Texas Securities Act allows for an indetermi-
nate class of actors to be held secondarily liable by including any person who,
acting with reckless disregard, "materially aids a seller."" That said, the liability
net under the Texas statute is narrowed by requiring an "intent to deceive or
defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law."'9 In contrast, courts
have interpreted Florida's statute to restrict the liability of secondary actors to
those persons that are specified insiders and agents who personally participate
or aid in effecting the transaction."o In practice, this requirement often limits
collateral actor liability to those who come within the Pinter "seller" test.9 '
88. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 581-33 (2010); see Highland Capital Mgmt., LP v. Ryder
Scott Co., 402 S.W-3 d 719, 733 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012); see also Steinberg & Claassen,
supra note 87, at 31.
89. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 581-33 § F(2). In contrast, the USA enumerates the class of
persons but does not require a showing of intent or recklessness; rather, the USA
provides a defense to the non-seller who carries the burden of proof of showing
reasonable care was taken and that the non-seller did not in fact know of the exist-
ence of facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. See Sterling Tr. Co.
v. Adderley, 168 S.W. 3d 835, 837 (Tex. 2005) (" [The Texas Securities Act's] re-
quirement of 'reckless disregard for the truth or the law' means that an alleged
aider is subject to liability only if it rendered assistance to the seller in the face of a
perceived risk that its assistance would facilitate untruthful or illegal activity by the
primary violator. This standard does not mean that the aider must know of the ex-
act misrepresentations or omissions made by the seller, but it does mean that the
aider must be subjectively aware of the primary violator's improper activity.").
90. See FLA. STAT. § 517.211(2) (2013) (subjecting to liability exposure a subject purchas-
er and seller "and every director, officer, partner, or agent of or for the purchaser
or seller, if [such person] has personally participated or aided in making the sale or
purchase"); Bailey v. Trenam Simmons, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye & O'Neill,
PA, 938 F. Supp. 825, 828 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (applying Florida law and holding that
general counsel to a company could not be held liable because he did not fall un-
der any of the categories of persons, [seller of a security or a director, officer, part-
ner, or agent of or for the seller of securities] allowed for under the Florida Securi-
ties laws, FLA. STAT. § 517.211(1), (2); further pointing out that "[t]he only basis of
liability would be a finding that [the defendant] was an agent of [the company]
with respect to the sale of securities to Plaintiffs. In addition to being an agent,
[the defendant] must also have 'personally participated or aided in making the
sale."'); see, e.g., Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 578, 588
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (applying Florida law) ("A plaintiff may recover under
§ 517.211 if he shows that defendant is either the seller of the securities or the 'agent
of such a seller who has solicited the sale of the securities on his own behalf or on
behalf of the seller."' (quoting In re Sahlen & Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp.
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California courts, on the other hand, explicitly reject the definition of "sell-
er" adopted in Pinter and instead require that privity exist between the plaintiff
and the defendant "seller."" While liability under California law is extended to
collateral actors in a manner almost identical to Section 410(b) of the USA,93
liability is also imposed on any person who materially assists certain securities
violations with the intent to deceive or defraud. 94 Another section of Califor-
nia's blue sky law directly addresses professionals, providing for liability if a
subject professional certifies certain documents distributed in connection with
the sale or offer of securities,95 but allows that professional to avoid liability by
342, 372 (S.D. Fla. 1991)); Rushing v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1254,
1260 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (stating that "there is authority for the premise that the sell-
er's agent can be liable if the agent solicits the sale of securities" (citing Hilliard v.
Black, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1083 (N.D. Fla. 2000))).
91. See Rushing, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1260 (applying Florida law, and citing Pinter as sup-
port for its premise that a seller's agent can be liable if the agent engages in solicita-
tion); Bailey, 938 F. Supp. at 828 ("[C]onduct sufficient to constitute solicitation
for purposes [of] § 517.211 liability is similar to that deemed sufficient by the Su-
preme Court in Pinter v. Dahl. . . .").
92. SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1289, 1296 (9 th Cir. 1982) ("[L]iability was limited
to actual sellers" and the seller's attorney "was not the literal seller, as required by
[California's provision imposing liability on sellers of securities]."); Apollo Capital
Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC, 158 Cal. App. 4 th 226, 253 (2007) (reject-
ing the argument that California's definition of "seller" is analogous to that in Pin-
ter and holding that liability as a seller of securities in California requires that priv-
ity be shown between the plaintiff and the defendant).
93. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504 (2016) ("Every person who directly or indirectly con-
trols a person liable under Section 25501 or 25503, every partner in a firm so liable,
every principal executive officer or director of a corporation so liable, every person
occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of a
person so liable who materially aids in the act or transaction constituting the viola-
tion, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the act or transaction
constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such person, unless the other person who is so liable had no knowledge
of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which
the liability is alleged to exist.").
94. Id. § 25504.1. Arguably, for liability to attach the actor apparently must have actual
knowledge of the fraud-with recklessness being insufficient. See Orloff v. Allman,
819 F.2d 904, 907 (9 th Cir. 1987) (implying that allegations of recklessness are not
sufficient and stating "CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.1 restricts liability for aiding and
abetting a state securities violation to cases where it is shown that the defendant
had an 'intent to deceive or defraud"').
95. Specifically, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.2(a) clarifies what documents are included
within the provision by stating that "[a] ny accountant, engineer, appraiser, or oth-
er person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by such person,
who pursuant to rule of the commissioner has given written consent to be and has
been named in any prospectus or offering circular distributed in connection with
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showing she had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, that no materi-
al misstatement was made.96
In addition, other states have created special statutory carve-outs for attor-
neys and other outside professionals that exempt them from liability when they
render incidental professional services.97 For example, Ohio extends aider liabil-
ity to anyone who, with the requisite culpability, aids the seller in any way in
making the sale;9' but the Ohio Securities Act, in a separate provision, clarifies
that attorneys, accountants, and engineers are excluded if that person's perfor-
mance was "incidental" to the practice of her profession.99 The attorney, ac-
countant, or engineer, therefore, will not be considered to have "aided in the
the offer or sale of securities as having prepared or certified in such capacity either
any part of such document or any written report or valuation which is distributed
with or referred to in any such document."
96. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.2; see also In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 903 F.
Supp. 2d 152, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying California law); In re Adelphia
Commc'ns Corp. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. 03 Civ 5751, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128908 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2011) (quoting Lubin v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425,
1453 (S.D. Cal. 1988)) (applying California law) ("The Ninth Circuit has held that
liability under section 25401 is limited to actual sellers, so that strict privity is re-
quired. Because the causes of action provided for in sections 25501, 25504, 25504.1
and 25504.2 are by their terms derived from section 25401, a failure to show strict
privity will defeat these derivative claims.").
97. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 44-2003(A) (2016) ("No person shall be deemed to have par-
ticipated in any sale or purchase solely by reason of having acted in the ordinary
course of that person's professional capacity in connection with that sale or pur-
chase."); OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.431 (2016). This legislative carve-out is different
from the majority approach of most states because most blue sky laws do not ex-
pressly contain an exemption for attorneys, but rather court interpretation has
held that none of the enumerated categories encompass outside attorneys per-
forming traditional legal services. See also Steinberg & Claassen, supra note 87, at 31
(describing the carve-outs enacted by certain states regarding attorneys).
98. OHIo REV. CODE § 1707.43 (2016) ("The person making such sale or contract for
sale, and every person that has participated in or aided the seller in any way in mak-
ing such sale or contract for sale, are jointly and severally liable to the purchaser ...
unless the court determines that the violation did not materially affect the protec-
tion contemplated by the violated provision." (emphasis added)). The statute has
been broadly interpreted. See In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d
857, 884 (S.D. Ohio 2010) ("The statute does not require knowledge, intent, or any
other mental state on the part of secondary actor, nor does it require reliance, in-
ducement, or proximate cause as between the secondary actor and purchaser.").
99. OHIo REV. CODE § 1707.431 ("For purposes of this section, the following persons
shall not be deemed to have effected, participated in, or aided the seller in any way
in making, a sale or contract of sale in violation of sections 1707.01 to 1707-45 of the
Revised Code: (A) Any attorney, accountant, or engineer whose performance is
incidental to the practice of the person's profession.").
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sale" if she was simply performing services traditionally performed in her re-
spective occupation."oo
Arizona law creates a similar carve-out scheme, which allows an action to
be brought against any person "who made, participated in or induced the un-
lawful sale or purchase,"' but then expressly states that "[n]o person shall be
deemed to have participated in any sale or purchase solely by reason of having
acted in the ordinary course of that person's professional capacity in connection
with that sale or purchase."'0 2 In construing this language, however, the Arizona
Supreme Court has clarified that the state securities act contains "sweeping lan-
guage of inclusion" and is to be liberally interpreted, thereby providing for its
applicability in many situations despite the carve-out. 03 Indeed, Arizona courts
have, in practice, construed the statutory safe harbor for outside professionals
narrowly, allowing for primary liability in many instances where an attorney has
rendered professional services. 10 4 While the scope of primary violators is inter-
ioo. Compare In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc. Inv. Litig., No. 2:03-MD-1565, 20o8
WL 1995216, at *9 (S.D. Ohio May 5, 2008) (holding attorney immune under
§ 1707.431 despite drafting a legal opinion letter), with Perkowski v. Megas Corp.,
563 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (denying attorney statutory protection
who received a commission for advertising an investment opportunity on a radio
talk show); and Gerlach v. Wergowski, 584 N.E.2d 1220, 1222-23 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989) (denying accountant protection who was a corporate director and treasurer
and who actively solicited plaintiffs to invest); see also McCartney v. Universal
Elec. Power Corp., No. 22417, 2005 WL 2020559, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 24,
2005) (stating that section 1707.431 "immunizes attorneys acting as legal counsel,
and not as salesmen, from R.C. 1707 securities fraud liability").
101. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 44-2003(a).
102. Id.
103. Grand v. Nacchio, 236 P.3d 398, 401 (Ariz. 2010) (en banc); Grubaugh v. DeCosta,
Nos. 1 CA-CV 97-0477, 1 CA-CV 98-oo60, 1999 Ariz. App. LEXIS 35, at *37 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Mar. 16, 1999) ("Arizona courts have consistently construed the Arizona
Securities Act in an expansive fashion resulting in greater liability than exists un-
der federal securities law."). Indeed, this is consistent with the legislature's appar-
ent intent, i.e., that the Act "not be given a narrow or restrictive interpretation or
construction, but [] be liberally construed as a remedial measure in order not to
defeat the purpose thereof." 1951 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 18, § 20.
104. See Facciola v. Greenberg Traurig LLC, No. CV-10-1o25-PHX-FJM, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61785, at *14 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2011) (holding that a law firm did not fall un-
der the safe harbor of the statute and reasoning: "This case is distinguishable
from ... an accounting firm preparing a negligent audit when it prepared the au-
dit in the normal course of its professional duties, and would have prepared the
audit without regard to securities transactions. In contrast, Greenberg was re-
tained in large part to prepare documents that were primarily designed to solicit
investors. This work is not merely 'tangentially' related to the sale of the securities,
but instead is a key component to the investor solicitation. We reject Greenberg's
argument that § 44-2003(A) immunizes any lawyer when acting as a lawyer, even if
he participates in his client's fraudulent scheme. Allegations that Greenberg know-
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preted broadly, the Arizona Supreme Court recently held that there is no cause
of action for aiding and abetting securities violations under the state's blue sky
laws.o5 Thus, although secondary liability has been effectively eliminated, col-
lateral actors under Arizona law may still be held liable as primary violators.o6
The Oregon Securities Act is likewise expansive."o7 While Oregon has sub-
stantially adopted the USA, it has expanded secondary liability to include "every
person who participates or materially aids in the sale."'Os The Oregon Supreme
Court, in turn, has interpreted its blue sky law to include the preparation of le-
gal materials for an offering within the meaning of "participat[ing] or material-
ly aid[ing] a violation," thereby exposing inside as well as outside counsel to li-
ability.' 9 The court has also made clear that the secondary actor's knowledge of
ingly assisted in ML's fraud are obviously acts beyond the ordinary course of
Greenberg's professional duties. A lawyer may not continue to provide services to
a client when the lawyer knows that the client is engaged in a course of conduct
designed to deceive others, and where it is obvious that the lawyer's compliant le-
gal services may be a substantial factor in permitting the deceit to continue."); All-
state Life Ins. Co. v. Robert W. Baird & Co., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1157-58 (D. Ariz.
2010) (distinguishing Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)) (holding that the plaintiff bondholders had adequately pled
facts indicating law firms had "participated in" the sale of bonds at issue and not-
ing: "[T]hese law firms were retained to prepare relevant documents that were
necessary to procure financing... . Thus, unlike the auditor in Standard Char-
tered, who would have conducted an audit irrespective of the securities transac-
tion, the law firms were hired for work that was not merely 'tangentially' related to
the sale of a security or that otherwise would have been performed if no sale had
been in progress. [The law firms] were retained for the sole purpose of preparing,
drafting, and reviewing documents that were primarily designed to solicit pur-
chasers for the Bonds."); see also In re Allstate Life Ins. Co. Litig., 971 F. Supp. 2d
930, 942 (D. Ariz. 2013) (holding that the fact that fifteen secondary market pur-
chasers had bought bonds through the defendant underwriters was "sufficient evi-
dence to create a triable issue of fact that those Defendants 'made' the sales under
the [Arizona Securities Act]"); Strom v. Black, 523 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1974) (holding an outside business broker liable for both participating in and in-
ducing a sale).
105. Sell v. Gama, 295 P-3d 421, 425-26 (Ariz. 2013) ("[T]he legislature did not expressly
authorize secondary liability for aiding and abetting in either the sections setting
forth the types of actionable fraudulent practices under the [Arizona Securities
statutes].... No ASA provision mentions the terms 'aiding' or 'abetting.'. . . [Sec-
tion 44-2003(a)] ... supports a claim for primary liability under § 44-1991; it does
not create a separate cause of action for, or secondary liability based on, aiding and
abetting.").
106. See Facciola, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61785; cases cited supra note 104.
107. OR. REv. STAT. § 59-115 (2016).
108. Id. § 59.115(3).
109. Adams v. Am. W. Sec., Inc., 51o P.2d 838, 844 (Or. 1973) (en banc) (holding that an
individual need not have actual knowledge of an illegal securities transaction to
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the underlying facts and circumstances is not determinative of whether second-
ary liability will attach:
Whether one's assistance in the sale is "material" does not depend on
one's knowledge of the facts that make it unlawful; it depends on the
importance of one's personal contribution to the transaction. Typing,
reproducing, and delivering sales documents may all be essential to a
sale, but they could be performed by anyone; it is a drafter's
knowledge, judgment, and assertions reflected in the contents of the
documents that are "material" to the sale."o
Another Oregon statute applies to any person who "materially aids in a viola-
tion" of that state's antifraud statute."' This statute has been interpreted to re-
quire reliance on the misstatements by the purchaser, but allows for reliance to
be established based on the "fraud-on-the-market" presumption.'1 2 Moreover,
although the Oregon statute expands the USA's scope to every person who par-
ticipates or materially aids in the sale, it retains the USA's affirmative defense." 3
become a participant nor have even communicated with the purchaser and stating
that an attorney could not avoid liability by ignoring what he saw and could readi-
ly have understood).
no. Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370, 1371 (Or. 1988) (en banc).
nll. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 59-135 (fraud and deceit with respect to securities or securities
business), 59-137(1) (liability in connection with violation of OR. REV. STAT.
§ 59-135). Note that the language of section 59.135 is patterned after Section lo(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012), and Rule iob-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.lob-5 (2016).
112. State v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 292 P.3d 525, 526 (Or. 2012). The U.S. Supreme
Court has given its approbation to the applicability of the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory of reliance in securities class actions brought for alleged violations of sec-
tion lo(b). See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014);
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); see also Ann M. Lipton, Halliburton and
the Dog that Didn't Bark, 1o DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2015).
113. OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3). The Oregon Supreme Court clarified that "[k]nowledge
becomes an element of liability only in the form of an affirmative defense, to be
proved by a nonseller, that he 'did not know, and, in the exercise of reasonable
care, could not have known, of the existence of the facts on which the liability is
based."' Prince, 764 P.2d at 1372. In so ruling, the court made clear that the Oregon
statute places upon persons who materially aid an unlawful sale of securities a
"substantial burden to exonerate themselves from liability for a resulting loss." Id.
Applied to outside collateral actors, the Oregon approach is not widely shared.
Under the court's implicit rationale, without this substantial burden to exonerate
themselves, outside gatekeepers are more likely to shirk their responsibility to the
investing public.
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The state of Washington takes yet another approach." 4 The Washington
Securities Act"' tracks the language of the USA with regard to civil liability, but
Washington courts have found, in certain contexts, attorneys and other profes-
sionals subject to liability exposure by broadly interpreting the term "seller." i6
Washington courts define a seller as any person whose acts were a "substantial
contributive factor" to the improper sale." 7 Under this rather expansive defini-
tion of the term, professionals may be deemed sellers, and thus subject to liabil-
ity as primary violators."' In defining "substantial contributive factor," Wash-
ington courts consider:
(i) the number of other factors which contribute to the sale and the ex-
tent of the effect which they have in producing it; (2) whether the de-
fendant's conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in
continuous and active operation up to the time of the sale, or has cre-
ated a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which
the actor is not responsible; and (3) lapse of time."'
Interestingly, the Washington Supreme Court has reasoned that its interpreta-
tion of the statutory definition of "seller" is consistent with an official comment
to the 1985 USA that sets forth the scope of seller status.'20
In Hines v. Data Line System, the Washington Supreme Court refined its
view by holding that outside professionals, specifically attorneys, were excluded
114. H.B. 2916, 20o6 Leg., 59th sess. (Wash. 2006) (adopting the Uniform Securities Act
under Chapter 21.20 of the Revised Washington Code).
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20-430 (2016).
116. See, e.g., Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987)
(en banc).
117. Silver Valley Partners, LLC v. De Motte, No. o6-429-N-ELJ, 2007 WL 2802315, at *9
(D. Idaho Sept. 24, 2007) (applying Washington law); FutureSelect Portfolio
Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 331 P-3d 29, 38 (Wash. 2014) (en
banc); Haberman, 744 P.2d 1032; Herrington v. David D. Hawthorne, CPA, PS, 47
P.3d 567, 570-71 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
n8. See In re Metro. Sec. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1300-01 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (refus-
ing to dismiss state securities fraud claims against an independent auditing and ac-
counting firm and an investment banking firm); Haberman, 744 P.2d at 1050 (re-
versing dismissal and adopting a substantial contributive factor test for
determining who is a "seller"); cf Hines v. Data Line Sys., 787 P.2d 8, 20 (Wash.
1990) (affirming summary judgment in favor of attorneys because there was insuf-
ficient evidence indicating their status as a seller).
119. Haberman, 744 P.2d at 1052.
120. Id. at 1051 (citing UNIF. SEC. ACT, § 605 cmt., which explains that "liability may be
imposed on a person in addition to the immediate seller if the person's participa-
tion was a substantial contributive factor in the violation").
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from the statutory definition of "seller." 2 1 In that case, the plaintiffs contended
that Perkins Coie, counsel for the seller in a stock offering, was liable as a "sell-
er, control person, director, or employee," but the court rejected their argument
that outside counsel qualified as a control person, director, or employee in one
sentence, stating that the investors had not provided "sufficient evidence" to
create a fact issue on these points.'2 2 Similarly, to be held liable as a seller under
the Washington statute, the court held that the firm must have done "some-
thing more" than perform typical or customary drafting and filing services.'2 3 In
addition, Washington courts have noted that a showing of reliance by the plain-
tiff-purchaser is required and, moreover, that such reliance must be reasona-
ble.124
In Hines, the plaintiffs alleged that the law firm's advice that the company
president's multiple brain aneurysms need not be disclosed to investors consti-
tuted the requisite "something more." 2 5 In ultimately denying seller status, the
court emphasized that the Perkins Coie attorneys neither had personal contact
with nor solicited investors. Furthermore, the court classified the firm's advice
as "the rendering of routine professional legal services in connection with an
offer" that did not rise to the level of acting as a "catalyst in the sales transac-
tion.""' Thus, once again, an outside actor avoided liability where an insider in
the same situation would likely have been held accountable. If the attorneys had
been inside counsel, the court may well have found that a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact existed, and the action would have proceeded.
V. EXPLORING AND TAMING THE ABYSS
With attorneys and other collateral actors largely beyond the reach of pri-
vate liability under the federal securities regime, state blue sky laws exist as an
alternative avenue for meaningful redress.' 7 Unfortunately, the USA, as enacted
by the states and applied by the courts, leaves a glaring absence of private liabil-
121. Hines, 787 P.2d at 20 (holding that outside counsel did not meet the definition of a
"seller" because counsel had no personal contact with investors and was not "in
any way involved in the solicitation process").
122. Id. at 19-21.
123. Id. at 20.
124. Stewart v. Estate of Steiner, 93 P. 3d 919, 923 n.9 (Wash. 2004) (citing Clausing v.
DeHart, 515 P.2d 982, 985 (Wash. 1973)).
125. Hines, 787 P.2d at 20 (defendants argued that this was the rendition of professional
services and did not substantially contribute to the violating sales).
126. Id.
127. SLUSA places significant limitations on this avenue by preempting state law, with
certain exceptions, in regard to class actions involving nationally traded securities,
thereby preventing these state claims from being brought in state or federal court.
Pub. L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998). For further discussion, see supra note 58.
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ity exposure for many central outside actors well situated to serve as gatekeep-
ers. Unable to proceed under the USA, private litigants are left to bring other
claims-such as common law fraud, aiding and abetting fraud, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and legal malpractice-that typically
require more onerous levels of mental culpability or entail other burdensome
procedural requirements.' This Part discusses how the statutorily enumerated
categories of persons under the USA have been interpreted and applied, thereby
impacting the troublingly disparate liability exposure of in-house versus outside
company personnel.
A. Attorneys as Agents
Any "agent" who materially aids in the sale or purchase of a security is po-
tentially liable. In the USA, "agent" is defined as "any individual other than a
broker-dealer who represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting
to effect purchases or sales of securities.""' While classifying attorneys and ac-
countants as "agents" of the seller may seem like a fairly reasonable interpreta-
tion, courts have generally not favored such a construction. Instead, the over-
whelming majority of courts have found just the opposite: attorneys are not
"agents" under the USA. In Bennett, for example, the plaintiff investors alleged
that the attorney Durham was a seller under the USA or, alternatively, an agent
of the seller. In holding that Durham was not an agent of the seller, the Sixth
Circuit focused on the word "effect" in the USA definition:
An attorney does not "effect," as opposed to "affect," purchases or sales
of securities.... An attorney performing ordinary legal work ... is not
hired to "carry out" or "bring about" the sale of securities; the attor-
ney's job is to ensure that any such sale, should the client choose to
pursue it, complies with the law. The attorney's work, it is true, may be
a but-for cause of a later sale of securities, but the statute requires
more. 30
Consistent with Bennett, other courts have held that an attorney is not an agent
of the seller if she has performed only traditional legal functions. 3 '
128. For further discussion on this point, see supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text.
129. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1956) (emphasis added); Bennett v.
Durham, 683 F-3d 734, 738 (6th Cir. 2012).
130. Bennett, 683 F.3d at 738.
131. See Ward v. Bullis, 748 N.W.2d 397, 403-o6 (N.D. 20o8) (quoting Baker, Watts &
Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356, 368 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)) (summa-
rizing relevant case law and stating "[t] his Court has not addressed whether an at-
torney may be liable for violations of securities laws, but other courts, applying
similar statutory definitions of an agent, have considered similar arguments and
held an attorney is not liable as an agent unless the attorney .. . act[s] in a manner
that goes beyond legal representation. The definition of 'agent'... does not in-
clude attorneys who merely provide legal services, draft documents for use in the
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Another argument militating against classifying attorneys, bankers, or audi-
tors as agents is based on the statutory definition of "agent" contained in the
USA. Because the USA mandates that "agents" register, rather than attorneys,
bankers, or auditors specifically, these individuals-engaged solely in their pro-
fessional functions-are not "agents" under the USA.' It follows, however,
that if an attorney, auditor, or banker acts outside the realm of ordinary profes-
sional services, then that conduct may be interpreted as representing a seller in
effecting a sale.' For example, an attorney who meets with and answers ques-
tions from prospective purchasers regarding the substance of a prospective in-
vestment may potentially be characterized as an agent. 134
purchase or sale of securities, or engage in their profession's traditional advisory
functions. To rise to the level of 'effecting' the purchase or sale of securities, the at-
torney must actively assist in offering securities for sale, solicit offers to buy, or ac-
tually perform the sale."); accord In re Infocure Sec. Litig. v. Infocure Corp., 210 F.
Supp. 2d 1331, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (holding attorney performing traditional legal
functions did not meet the definition of "employee" or "agent" under South Caro-
lina, North Carolina, or Michigan blue sky laws); CFT Seaside Inv. Ltd. P'ship v.
Hammet, 868 F. Supp. 836, 844 (D.S.C. 1994) ("The definition of 'agent' in [South
Carolina's securities statute] is not intended to cover professionals such as attor-
neys engaging in their traditional advisory functions."); Rendler v. Markos, 453
N.W.2d 202, 2o6 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) ("The definition of 'agent' [in Wisconsin se-
curities laws] does not include attorneys who merely render legal advice or draft
documents for use in securities transactions.").
132. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(14); see Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d
356, 368 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (relying on the definition of agent in the Act);
Steinberg & Claassen, supra note 87, at 6.
133. A Vermont court has found a law firm to be an agent of the seller for drafting an
offering memorandum, but this results from a definition of "agent" in Vermont's
statute different from that in the commonly adopted USA. Thus, this finding is
not widely applicable. The definition of "agent" in the Vermont statute was modi-
fied from that in the USA to also include "its ordinary meaning." Since attorneys
would fall under the typical understanding of "agent" in regard to a client, the law
firm could be held liable as an agent. The law firm in this case had prepared the
Offering Memorandum and the Amended Offering. In other states, "agent" is
statutorily defined and does not include its ordinary meaning. Hence, "agent" is
defined as an individual who represents an issuer or broker-dealer "in effecting or
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities." See Powell v. H.E.F. P'ship,
835 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Vt. 1993).
134. Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, 616 F. Supp. 458, 467 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (applying West
Virginia law and holding attorney potentially liable as agent for making face-to-
face and direct telephonic representations to the buyer that materially aided in ef-
fecting the sale); Johnson v. Colip, 658 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind. 1995) (holding that it
was a material issue of fact about whether an attorney's conduct at the meetings
with prospective investors constituted an attempt to effect the sale of securities by
making it more likely than not that investors would purchase the securities); Oster
v. Kirschner, 77 A.D.3d 51, 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (applying New Jersey law and
holding that, at the pleading stage, there were adequate allegations that the attor-
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In sum, absent classification as an agent of the seller who materially aids a
violation (or status liability based on being a control person, officer, partner, or
director), outside counsel ordinarily would escape private securities liability de-
spite materially assisting a securities violation. For inside lawyers, as well as oth-
er in-house personnel, who are employed by the defendant seller corporation, a
different result will often follow."'
B. Attorneys as Employees
Attorneys, just like other laborers, are subject to categorization as employ-
ees or independent contractors by courts.1' Moreover, attorneys from outside
firms, including temporary personnel agencies, 13 7 act as service providers to
corporations. 13 While little case law directly addresses the viability of defining
inside counsel as employees under the USA, there are decisions in other con-
texts that do just that.'13 9
Thus, while judicial analysis of inside counsel as employees under the USA
is scant, the definition of "employee" has been discussed in the context of the
neys were liable as agents "who materially aided in the 'sale or conduct' constitut-
ing the violation").
135. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b). Note that a company's chief legal officer or general coun-
sel also may incur liability exposure under the USA as an "officer." Id.
136. See, e.g., Cave v. Comm'r, 476 F. App'x 424, 425 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Breaux &
Daigle, Inc. v. United States, goo F.2d 49, 51 (5th Cir. 1990)) (discussing factors for
determining whether an attorney is an independent contractor or an employee
"including the 'degree of control, opportunities for profit or loss, investment in fa-
cilities, permanency of relation, and skill required in the claimed independent op-
eration"').
137. Several agencies provide placement of attorneys in temporary and contract posi-
tions to law firms and corporate legal departments. See, e.g., About Us, ROBERT
HALF, http://www.roberthalf.com/about-us [http://perma.cc/C7X3-UGKB]; Our
Firm, HIRE COUNSEL, http://www.hirecounsel.com/who-we-are/our-firm/ [http://
perma.cc/4WR7-R3KC].
138. Peter S. Trotter, Working with Inside Counsel, 101 ILL. B.J. 642, 642 (2013) (discuss-
ing the role of outside counsel being hired as a service provider and noting the hir-
ing and supervising of a variety of outside counsel by inside counsel on both a lim-
ited-engagement and long-term basis).
139. See, e.g., Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Minn. 199i) ("The
fact remains, however, that the in-house attorney is also a company employee, and
we see no reason to deny the job security aspects of the employer-employee rela-
tionship if this can be done without violence to the integrity of the attorney-client
relationship."); see also Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 496
(Cal. 1994) (citing Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 502) ("For matters of compensation,
promotion, and tenure, inside counsel are ordinarily subject to the same adminis-
trative personnel supervision as other company employees.").
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USA.1 40 While "employee" is not defined in the Act, case law has recognized
that common law principles apply.141 In other words, courts have most often
given "employee" its plain and ordinary meaning.' According to a South
Carolina court, in Allen v. Columbia Financial Management, Ltd.,'43 "employer"
and "employee" are rooted in the terms "master" and "servant." 44 Hence, the
principal factor for determining who qualifies as an employee is the same as was
used to determine who was a servant: the right of the employer-master "to con-
trol and direct the particular work or undertaking as to the means or manner of
its accomplishment." 4 5 Outside secondary actors in a securities transaction typ-
ically will not fall under this definition of "employee," as they themselves are
usually responsible for the "means or manner" of achieving the work assigned.
In Allen, the plaintiffs sued outside corporate counsel under the theory that
outside counsel were "employees of the seller, because they were retained by the
seller for certain services." Not surprisingly, the court rejected this contention,
citing a lack of evidence indicating that outside counsel was subject to the de-
gree of control necessary to be deemed an employee.' " This pronouncement
that outside counsel are not employees is consistent with the view held by
courts and commentators.' 47
Another court, in Jablonski v. Victor D, 41 by contrast, defined outside actors
as employees. In Jablonski, Arthur Andersen, the outside auditor accused of aid-
140. See, e.g., CFT Seaside Inv. LP v. Hammet, 868 F. Supp. 836, 843 (D.S.C. 1994) (ap-
plying South Carolina Law); Allen v. Columbia Fin. Mgmt., Ltd., 377 S.E.2d 352,
356-57 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988).
141. See, e.g., Allen, 377 S.E.2d at 356-57; see also JOSEPH C. LONG, 12-12A BLUE SKY LAW §
9:88 (2010).
142. See In re Infocure Sec. Litig. v. Infocure Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1364 (N.D. Ga.
2002) (applying Georgia law); CFT Seaside, 868 F. Supp. at 843 (applying South
Carolina law); Allen, 377 S.E.2d at 356-57.
143. 377 S.E.2d 352 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988).
144. Id. at 356. See generally Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23
(1992); Hutson v. Herndon, 133 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1963); Bates v. Legette, 121 S.E.2d
289, 293 (S.C. 1961).
145. In re Infocure, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1364; CFT Seaside, 868 F. Supp. at 843 (citing Hut-
son, 133 S.E.2d at 756); Bates, 121 S.E.2d at 293.
146. Allen, 377 S.E.2d at 356-57; see In re Infocure, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (holding that
an outside law firm was not an employee of a seller, citing Allen); CFT Seaside, 868
F. Supp. at 842 (same).
147. See Long, supra note 141, § 9:88 ("[I]ndependent auditors and outside counsel are
not employees." (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Hines v. Data Line Sys., 787 P.2d 8,
21 (Wash. 1990); cases cited supra notes 139, 146.
148. No. C85-2274V 1986, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26697, at *I (W.D. Wash. Apr. 16, 1986)
(applying Washington law); see supra notes 144-47.
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ing and abetting violations of the Washington Securities Act,1 49 moved to dis-
miss, asserting that outside auditors did not fall within any of the enumerated
categories of parties subject to participant liability under the Act. The court de-
nied the motion, holding instead that "Andersen could be considered an em-
ployee of the sellers of the securities who materially aided the sales transac-
tion."' This broad interpretation of "employee of the seller" contradicts the
plain meaning of "employee" as it is understood under common-law princi-
ples."' Defining "employee" expansively in this area of the law could have unin-
tended adverse ramifications if such a construction were expanded to the myri-
ad areas of law where "employee" status comes into play.152 Such a broad
definition of "employee" has, unremarkably, not received widespread approba-
tion by other courts.1 53
149. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(3) (2016).
150. Jablonski, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26697, at *4-
151. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
152. Employee status is critically important in many areas of tort law, for example. The
doctrine of respondeat superior subjects an employer to vicarious liability for the
negligent conduct of an employee performed within the scope of employment. See,
e.g., Mary M. v. City of L.A., 814 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Cal. 1991); Chesterman v. Barmon,
753 P.2d 404, 406 (Or. 1988) (en banc); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513,
541-42 (Tex. 2002). Employee status can also be important in limiting an injured
party's available remedies to solely statutory prescriptions. See, e.g., Lomeli v. Sw.
Shipyard, LP, 363 S.W. 3d 681, 689-90 (Tex. App. 2011) (affirming dismissal of a
negligence claim because plaintiff held the status of "employee;" thus, the exclu-
sive remedy provision of the federal Longshoremen and Harbor Worker's Com-
pensation Act applied, defeating any common law negligence claim). The designa-
tion of outside contractors as employees could expose employers to significantly
increased liability exposure for independent contractors and their employees. See,
e.g., SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc., 258 P-3d 737, 741 (Cal. 2011) (concluding
that "an independent contractor's hirer implicitly delegates to that contractor its
tort law duty, if any, to provide the employees of that contractor a safe work-
place"). Moreover, outside contractors being deemed employees leads to increased
regulation over treatment, pay, and other benefits reserved for employees. See, e.g.,
Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., 161 F.3d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding workers were independent contractors under the Fair Labor Standards
Act meaning minimum wage, overtime compensation, and record keeping provi-
sions of the Act did not apply). Another example is the National Labor Relations
Act, which only applies to "employees" and specifically excludes "independent
contractors." See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012);
NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 255 (1968); see also Katherine V.W. Stone,
Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without
Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 253
(20o6) (discussing the lack of legal protections for independent contractors and
temporary workers).
153. See, e.g., In re Infocure Sec. Litig. v. Infocure Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1364 (N.D.
Ga. 2002) (applying a narrower definition of "employee" for USA purposes); CFT
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Nonetheless, in a similarly expansive reading, an Alaska court, denying a
motion for summary judgment, indicated that it would accept a broader defini-
tion of "employee,"-and, moreover, one that might very well include both
outside counsel and attorneys hired from temporary service agencies.15 4 Pottle v.
Coffey involved alleged violations by the outside counsel, Coffey, who rendered
legal services to a closely held corporation.' The Pottle court abandoned the
requirement of control over the means and manner of the work and instead de-
fined "employee" as "one who renders services to another for pay.""' However,
the court recognized that other courts had not held outside legal counsel liable
as employees when "their involvement was 'only tangential' or 'minimal at
most.""" Still, after citing case law from other jurisdictions, the court decided
that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the attorney could
be classified as an employee."'
This decision minimizes the difference between independent contractors
and employees. While such a broad definition of "employee" in this context
would encompass outside professionals, it is an unacceptable solution-first,
Seaside Inv. LP v. Hammet, 868 F. Supp. 836, 842 (D.S.C. 1994) (same); Allen v.
Columbia Fin. Mgmt., Ltd., 377 S.E.2d 352, 356-57 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (same).
154. See Pottle v. Coffey, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) T 73,226, No. 3AN 86-9414, 1989 WL
1724589 (Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1989); see also Joe Borstein, Alt.legal: The $22BN
Contract Lawyer Marketplace Is up for Grabs, 'Hire an Esquire' Plans To Catch It,
ABOVE L. (Feb. 10, 2016, 5:44 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2o16/02/alt-legal-the-
21bn-contract-lawyer-marketplace-is-up-for-grabs-hire-an-esquire-plans-to-
catch-it/ [http://perma.cc/TMU4-3Z3E] (discussing the demand for temporary or
contract lawyers, citing an annual spend on legal contract labor in the United
States of twenty-one billion dollars); Vanessa O'Connell, Lawyers Settle ... for
Temp Jobs, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SBloool424052702303714704576383641752966666 [http://perma.cc/URS4-375D]
(noting the significant increase in the use of temporary attorneys with the percent-
age of temporary private law practice jobs rising from 5.4% of all private practice
jobs in 2007 to 10% in 2011).
155. Pottle, 1989 WL 1724589.
156. Id. Such a definition, applied broadly in the law, would result in temporary or
contract workers and outside contractors falling under the definition of "employ-
ee.
157. Id. (citing Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 1981)).
158. Id. ("Conversely, a corporate attorney who was a 'key participant' or played 'an
active role' in a securities sale has been held liable as a seller for the sale of unregis-
tered securities.. . . Although the plaintiff has established that Mr. Coffey played
some role in the sale of CPRS stock, the extent and nature of Mr. Coffey's partici-
pation is not clear." (citing Junker v. Crory, 65o F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir. 1981);
Ahern v. Gaussoin, 6n F. Supp. 1465 (D. Or. 1985))). Note that the Fifth Circuit's
definition of "seller" in Junker was subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court in
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), in favor of a narrower construction. See supra
notes 55-56, 67-68 and accompanying text.
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due to the distinct prospect of adverse ramifications in other areas of the law (as
discussed above) and, second, because the vast majority of courts already define
the term "employee" in terms of control.' 9 To expand this definition would ne-
cessitate a sea change in the current predominant approach and would, accord-
ingly, challenge significant precedent. Moreover, this definition would include
temporary attorneys and other personnel hired from temporary service provid-
ers, wreaking havoc in job markets by blurring previously distinct categories of
workers.160
To recap, absent classification as an agent or employee, outside attorneys
and other outside professionals integral to the securities offering process escape
private liability under the USA."' Outside professionals not subject to the USA
still might be held liable under a claim for fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
common law aiding and abetting fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, or legal mal-
practice.16 2 However, these avenues are problematic as they entail their own
unique challenges, such as significantly increased procedural burdens or elevat-
ed mens rea requirements as compared to the USA.' 63
Hence, in practice, the only way outside attorneys and other professionals
will be held accountable under the USA is if they take on a dual role as a part-
ner, officer, director, or control person of the seller. Outside legal counsel and
other collateral actors could incur "status liability" (meaning liability can attach
without a showing that the "status" person materially aided the violation) if any
of the aforementioned roles are taken on. The language is clear, confirmed by
case law, that status as a control person or any of the other listed designations
(such as serving as an officer or director) does not require that the actor materi-
159. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text; see also Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc.,
673 F.2d 337, 340 (11th Cir. 1982) (adopting the common, ordinary understanding
of employee in the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 20ooe et seq. (2012)); Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Tex. 1964)
("We believe, however, that the solution of the question presented in this case is
correctly reached by the application of the test of right of control, which, accord-
ing to our decisions and most of the modern cases, is used as the supreme test.").
160. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (discussing the expansive ramifica-
tions of such a broad definition of employee).
161. Subject to the exception for those secondary actors deemed control persons as out-
lined in the federal securities laws imposing control person. liability. See Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et seq. (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. §
78(a) et seq.; UNIF. SEC. ACT. § 410(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1956).
162. See Bennett v. Durham, 683 F.3d 734, 738 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[A]n attorney who
knowingly drafted materially false or misleading documents would face other
problems. He might be liable for fraud... [o]r he might be liable for malpractice
or face disciplinary proceedings.").
163. For example, derivative litigation often involves making a demand on the board of
directors, while fraud claims typically require a showing of intent. See supra notes
32-50 (discussing the shortfalls of other types of liability in this context).
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ally aid the violation."4 Absent the undertaking of such a dual role, then, out-
side gatekeepers, integral in detecting and preventing securities law violations,
are insulated from private securities liability under the USA for their miscon-
duct. In the same manner, temporary professional workers, an ever-expanding
segment of business workers,'' avoid such private securities liability because of
their lack of "employee" status. The next Section of this Article discusses the
problems that arise due to this regulatory abyss and offers meaningful solutions
for revitalizing the gatekeeping function traditionally served by attorneys, ac-
countants, and other pertinent actors.
C. What Is Lost to the Abyss
A system that allows complicit attorneys, accountants, and other collateral
participants to escape private securities liability is fraught with problems that,
over time, will degrade investor confidence and market integrity as well as the
public image of these professions. Moreover, the obvious inequity that partici-
pant liability will often hinge on employment status presents ethical quandaries`
for professionals as well as significant concerns regarding investor protection
and corporate governance. As discussed in Part I, these gatekeepers are integral
to the regulatory regime in the United States.
While human conduct is difficult to predict, certain behaviors are likely to
ensue when adverse consequences, such as the specter of potential liability, are
present.' 6 Conversely, when such incentives are lacking, the cost of complicity
in wrongdoing is lessened, potentially resulting in enfeebled gatekeeper func-
tioning. Moreover, incentivizing the gatekeeping function through the specter
of secondary liability is effective and consistent with public policy objectives.
164. See Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d
871 (2d Cir. 1970), adhered to on reh'g, 430 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1970) ("In defining lia-
bility, the statute imposes liability on an employee of a seller only if he 'materially
aids in the sale,' but it puts no similar restrictions on the liability of a partner, of-
ficer, or director."); Mitchell v. Beard, 513 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Ark. 1974) (recognizing
strict liability for a "partner" as distinguished from an "employee, broker, or
agent"); Taylor v. Perdition Minerals Grp., Ltd., 766 P.2d 805, 809 (Kan. 1988)
("The states that have passed § 410(b) of the Uniform Securities Act have consist-
ently interpreted the statute to impose strict liability on partners, officers, and di-
rectors unless the statutory defense of lack of knowledge is proven."); see also
Steinberg & Claassen, supra note 87, at 14 & n.8o (stating that "for liability to attach
to the first three groups, there is no condition that they provide material aid or
otherwise participate in the transaction" and providing various example cases in
the accompanying footnote).
165. See Borstein, supra note 154.
166. See generally Naci H. Mocan & R. Kai Gittings, The Impact of Incentives on Human
Behavior: Can We Make It Disappear? The Case of the Death Penalty (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12631, 20o6), http://www.nber.org/papers/
W12631.pdf [http://perma.cc/MC68-VA9V].
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While no definitive research has been conducted, there is evidence that the im-
plementation of a robust secondary liability framework provides tangible bene-
fits that outweigh potential costs.'6" Existing research, along with the occurrence
of massive scandals that all too frequently result when gatekeepers fail to act ap-
propriately, support the inference that the gatekeeping function, as traditionally
envisioned, is an effective means of investor protection.' Adherence to sound
gatekeeping practices thus may be encouraged through the threat of potential
private securities liability, which is obviated by meeting an affirmative defense
of reasonable care by those gatekeepers who materially aid violative conduct.
Gatekeepers facilitate issuer access to the securities markets by their partici-
pation and can provide a necessary check on contemplated perpetration of im-
proper corporate action.169 In practice, gatekeepers should function as a control
system, green lighting transactions that are law-compliant and seeking to halt
transactions that are based on faulty information or are otherwise illegal."o As
the corporate securities landscape changes, becoming increasingly complex,
167. Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud: Gatekeepers in State
Court, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 463, 502-03 (2011). Professor Johnson analyzed Oregon
case law as well as claims from a mandatory malpractice insurance program main-
tained by the Oregon Bar Association, which provided data on the number of se-
curities actions against attorneys. Specifically, Professor Johnson looked at the pe-
riod of time following the Oregon Supreme Court decision, Prince v. Brydon, 764
P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988), which held that attorneys performing traditional legal ser-
vices could be held secondarily liable for materially aiding a securities violation.
She found "there was not a marked increase in Professional Liability Fund claims
processed in the Prince aftermath" and notes "the trend remains fairly constant
throughout the [Professional Liability Fund] reporting years, without the expected
rise following the Prince decision." Johnson, supra note 167, at 504. Additionally,
Professor Johnson notes that "Oregon attorneys do not report any noticeable in-
crease in securities offerings without professional involvement; to the contrary,
one noted positive trend is that attorneys not conversant in securities law are ad-
vised to refer potential issuers to those with experience." Id. at 505. This research
on secondary liability "suggests that the potential benefits for investor protection
outweigh costs associated with increased secondary liability." Id. at 506.
168. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
169. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting the pivotal role that
gatekeepers play); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 289 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (discussing the need for gatekeepers or "reputational intermediaries").
170. See In re Fields, Exchange Act Release No. 5404, 11972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 179,407, at 83,175 n.20 (June 18, 1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (SEC noting that attorneys occupy an important position in the invest-
ment process and that the SEC is especially dependent on the diligence of the pro-
fessionals that practice before it because of its limited resources); U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-ni-664, SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY OF SECONDARY
ACTORS (2011) ("Attorneys play important roles in securities transactions....
Counsel generally reviews the veracity and completeness of registration materials
and attempts to ensure that a thorough investigation of the issuer is made.").
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gatekeepers must, to properly fulfill their obligations, maintain a heightened
sense of vigilance when providing services that are vitally necessary for the suc-
cessful consummation of a securities transaction. 7 '
The USA, as currently implemented, places this vigilance requirement on
inside actors, but fails to demand this same vigilance from outside actors per-
forming the same vital functions. By failing to incentivize "outside" gatekeepers,
the USA fails to create an effective system for protecting the securities markets.
The USA's failure to properly incentivize inside actors is problematic for two
reasons: first, because it results in an overall loss in gatekeeping protection, and
second, because it results in disturbing inequities with respect to secondary lia-
bility. Employees, including inside counsel and internal auditors, are civilly lia-
ble under the state securities laws while outside counsel, auditors, and other
outside collateral actors who engage in identical conduct are beyond the reach
of private liability under the USA.
Such disparity in treatment of outside professionals and inside profession-
als unfairly burdens companies employing inside counsel with more liability
risk. As the 2008 recession rocked the country,1 2 the corporate legal services
market found itself in the midst of transformation.1 3 Faced with tightening
budgets, corporations have increasingly relied on inside legal counsel to handle
legal matters that traditionally were assigned to an outside law firm.17 4 This
trend could result in unforeseen costs if plaintiffs' attorneys begin targeting in-
171. As former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh explained, in the context of
general counsel, "[T]he role of attorneys as gatekeepers needs to be strengthened.
The role of corporate counsel has changed dramatically in recent times. Historical-
ly, a general counsel's primary client was senior management and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the board. While general counsel must continue to serve these constituencies,
they also now are viewed by regulators and potential litigants as gatekeepers to the
interests of the company's shareholders." Richard Thornburgh, Remarks at the
SMU 16th Annual Corporate Counsel Symposium: The Importance of Gatekeep-
ers in Protecting Investors from Corporate Fraud and Corruption 8 (Oct. 3, 2008).
172. See generally Justin Baer & Chelsey Dulaney, Goldman Reaches $5 Billion Settlement
over Mortgage-Backed Securities, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/goldman-reaches-5-billion-settlement-over-mortgage-backed-
securities-1452808185 [http://perma.cc/44NP-KRSG] (discussing the largest regula-
tory penalty of Goldman Sachs' history over toxic mortgages it bundled and sold
to unsuspecting investors); World Econ. & Fin. Surveys, World Economic Outlook:
Crisis and Recovery, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Apr. 2009), http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/ol/pdf/text.pdf [http://perma.cc/2SUJ-V3KZ].
173. Juliana Kenny, Impacts of the Recession on the Legal Industry: Expert Ed Winslow
Provides Insight into How the Legal Industry Is Moving Towards Segmentation in a
Post-Recession World, INSIDE COUNS. MAG. (July 28, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.
insidecounsel.com/2014/o7/28/impacts-of-the-recession-on-the-legal-industry
[http://perma.cc/KCN2-LNJ8].




YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
side counsel for securities violation liability under the USA. As is normally the
case when circumstances change, the plaintiffs' bar adapts and pursues reme-
dies for aggrieved investors wherever practicable."' In the face of heightened
difficulty proving private claims against outside actors, inside counsel may be-
come a primary target. Not only may such selective treatment be viewed as un-
fair, but it is also detrimental to companies that employ inside professionals.
With litigation resources disproportionately focused on inside actors, subject
companies will quite likely face enhanced and disparate financial burdens, in
the form of increased insurance costs and indemnification expenses."6 Smaller
companies unable to shoulder the added expense of utilizing outside profes-
sionals will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. In
view of their shared gatekeeping obligations, companies employing inside coun-
sel as well as outside counsel themselves should bear the burden of these costs
in an equitable manner.
Meanwhile, because proving the requisite mental intent or overcoming
challenging procedural hurdles typically is necessary to hold outside profession-
als accountable in private actions, '7 lack of diligence and vigilance among out-
side professionals who are insulated from private securities liability remains a
concern. In fact, an outside secondary actor that falls outside of the USA's pro-
visions could knowingly assist fraudulent conduct without incurring private li-
ability under either the federal securities laws or the USA.17 These loopholes
raise the prospect that even law-abiding companies might be inclined, for loss-
reduction purposes, to enhance their number of retained independent contrac-
tors and temporary professional workers with a corresponding reduction for in-
house personnel. Corporations already commonly utilize contract attorneys,' 7 9
175. See, e.g., In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 236, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(citing Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F-3d 101, 107-08, 108 n.4 (2d
Cir. 2001)) (noting that plaintiffs, when restricted by the PSLRA, sidestepped the
restrictions by proceeding under state "blue sky" laws before the passage of
SLUSA); see also discussion supra note 58 and accompanying text.
176. An analogous situation was the passing of PSLRA which made it harder for plain-
tiffs to bring class actions involving nationally traded securities based on the feder-
al securities laws. Plaintiff attorneys responded by flooding state courts with class
actions based on state securities laws, prompting the passage of SLUSA that, with
certain exceptions, preempts state law and thereby prevents these suits. See MARC
I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 674-82 (6th ed. 2013); supra note 53 and ac-
companying text.
177. See supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
178. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1956); see, e.g., Bennett v.
Durham, 683 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Kentucky law) (discussing that
outside attorney could escape private civil liability under the USA despite know-
ingly drafting fraudulent documents).
179. Robert Reich, Why We're All Becoming Independent Contractors, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 22, 2015, 5:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/why-were-
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arguably due in part to the liability laws."'o And this migration from an employ-
ee workforce to a contractor workforce frequently carries with it reduction in
pay and benefits for workers."' Finally, the far too frequent episodic avoidance
of gatekeeping functions by attorneys in the absence of proper incentives to in-
terdict will only exacerbate the crisis in public perception of attorneys as uneth-
all-becoming-independent-contractors_b_673176o.html [http://perma.cc/3FR9-
5PE2]; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the trend toward
the use of contract workers in the legal field and noting businesses that specialize
in providing temporary executive workers).
180. Corporate focus on risk management would imply that this is a consideration
when determining whether to utilize independent contractors or retain permanent
employees. See Robert F. Weber, An Alternative Story of the Law and Regulation of
Risk Management, 15 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1005 (2013).
181. Nancy Cremins, The Rise of the On-demand Economy: The Tension Between Cur-
rent Employment Laws and Modern Workforce Realities, Bos. B. J., (Jan. 13, 2016),
http://bostonbarjournal.com/2016/01/13/the-rise-of-the-on-demand-economy-
the-tension-between-current-employment-laws-and-modern-workforce-realities/
[http://perma.cc/PNJ7-3W88] ("Workers classified as independent contractors do
not have access to company-provided benefits and protections such as paid time
off. They are not given the payment protections of minimum wage, and overtime
pay. Nor do they have the safeguards of worker's compensation and unemploy-
ment insurance. These workers also shoulder the cost of the business expenses in-
curred in performing their jobs, such as their tools, supplies, or the cost of vehicle
operation (though those are deductible business expenses). In addition, workers
are responsible for paying all taxes on pay, which means the company is not con-
tributing to employment taxes, Social Security, or Medicare."); see also Reich, su-
pra note 179 ("The rise of 'independent contractors' is the most significant legal
trend in the American workforce-contributing directly to low pay, irregular
hours, and job insecurity. What makes them 'independent contractors' is ... that
the companies they work for say they are. So those companies don't have to pick
up the costs of having full-time employees. But are they really 'independent'?
Companies can manipulate their hours and expenses to make them seem so. It's
become a race to the bottom. Once one business cuts costs by making its workers
'independent contractors,' every other business in that industry has to do the
same-or face shrinking profits and a dwindling share of the market.").
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ical.as Accountants and outside auditors, in the face of Enron and more recent
debacles, face similar problems in public perception.8 3
With respect to attorneys, the problem is obvious: when attorneys are held
to different ethical-and liability-standards based arbitrarily on whether an
attorney is an employee versus outside counsel or an independent contractor,
disparate treatment, perverse corporate governance incentives, damage to the
reputation of the profession, and significant degradation of investor protection
result.
D. Rescue from the Abyss: Meaningful Solutions for Filling the Gap in
Liability
There are numerous ways the regulatory abyss might be addressed, but
many possible avenues for reform would be impractical in light of legislative
and judicial hurdles. For example, the definition of "agent" might be interpret-
ed to include attorneys and other professionals involved in the securities trans-
action process. In the same respect, the definition of "employee" in this context
could be construed more broadly to include outside actors such as outside
counsel, outside auditors, and other outside collateral actors. However, this
brand of reform would be unlikely and undesirable, as it would certainly impact
other areas of law and call for judges to overrule both common law principles
and long-established precedent.8 4
Oregon's approach-which prescribes civil liability for every person who
materially aids a violation, allowing a defense of reasonable care-is another
possible solution. But, many jurisdictions would likely decline to take such an
overtly plaintiff-friendly approach. This type of reform could be perceived as
implicating too many tangential actors in private damages actions, chilling the
securities markets and wasting resources through vexatious litigation.
182. See Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi-The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79
A.B.A. J. 60 (1993) (discussing the perception of attorneys by the public as unethi-
cal and the various ethical improprieties by attorneys which have come to light);
Public Esteem for Military Still High, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2013), http://www
.pewforum.org/2o13/07/n/public-esteem-for-military-still-high/ [http://perma.cc/
7NB4-KN45] (finding lawyers ranked last by occupation in public esteem when
compared with ten other occupations). See generally Jennifer K. Robbennolt &
Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1107 (2013) (describing
the high instance of unethical behavior by attorneys and exploring possible psy-
chological causes).
183. See Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron Decision: Closing the Fraud-free Zone on Errant
Gatekeepers, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 447 (2003); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Cor-
porate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 144 (2002)
("Andersen's indictment and conviction for obstruction of justice highlighted the
role of accountants in structuring and auditing corporate transactions that turned
out to be fraudulent or illegal."); supra notes 8-29.
184. See supra notes 132-37, 153-62, and accompanying text.
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Thus, this Article posits that the regulatory abyss would best be remedied
by making changes to the structure of the USA. Since the USA has been amend-
ed in the past, it is amenable to adaptation in the future."' While the 2002 revi-
sion added the language "associate of the seller" in addition to "employee of the
seller,""' this language has not been widely adopted"' and fails to provide suffi-
cient clarity. In addition, many state legislatures may legitimately be concerned
that the language "associated with" is too expansive, thereby encompassing un-
intended parties within the liability net. Thus, a solution to the current gap in
liability must reach those parties best positioned to fulfill the gatekeeping role,
but avoid any ambiguity that might result in over-inclusion via judicial miscon-
struction. This Article proposes such a solution.
The USA should be amended to include every person who, directly or indi-
rectly, has or maintains a contractual relationship with the seller or whose employ-
er or contractor, directly or indirectly,' has or maintains a contractual relation-
ship with the seller who materially aids in the sale. The amended USA would
provide as follows:
(b) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under
subsection (a), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, every
person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, eve-
ry employee of such a seller who materially aids in the sale, every per-
son who, directly or indirectly, has or maintains a contractual relation-
ship with the seller or whose employer or contractor, directly or
indirectly, has or maintains a contractual relationship with the seller
who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who
materially aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally with and
to the same extent as the seller, unless the non-seller who is so liable
sustains the burden of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by
reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as
in cases of contract among the several persons so liable."9
185. For example, the categories of investment advisers, representatives, and those giv-
ing investment advice for financial benefit have been added to the USA. See UNIF.
SEC. ACT § 410(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002) (adding as a category of persons
those giving advice for financial benefit).
186. See id. § 509(g) (3).
187. See supra note 81 (noting that the majority of states have adopted the Uniform Se-
curities Act of 1956); supra note 85 (explaining the lack of precedent or comment
on this "associated" language).
188. The addition of the "directly or indirectly" language is intended as a safeguard
against potentially subject entities using corporate intermediaries or other types of
business enterprises to avoid liability under the Act.
189. Proposed addition bold and italicized.
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By employing this language, the unwarranted distinction between employees
and "contract vendors" would be eliminated. Moreover, this language is not
over-encompassing and does not have the ambiguity present in the term "asso-
ciated with the seller" found in the 2002 amendment to the USA. It would also
ensure that outside counsel and other outside professionals are held to the same
standard as their counterparts working within the subject corporation. Further,
aggrieved investors would not be arbitrarily deprived of a private remedy under
the Act.
The application of the USA to all such collateral actors, whether employees
or outside advisers, would provide stability in application and should not pro-
duce an undue chilling effect on professional services incidental to securities
transactions. Rather, in practice, this approach should incentivize outside gate-
keepers to aptly perform their obligations. In addition, it provides a fair and
predictable application of the law that aids aggrieved investors, protects the
reputation of collateral securities professionals, and enhances the integrity of
the securities markets as a whole.
Finally, this recommended approach would not detrimentally affect those
secondary actors integral to the securities offering process. This is because, first,
secondary liability was prevalent in the federal arena for several decades and, in
fact, the law in every circuit supported it.190 Second, collateral actors have been
and are still subject to government enforcement actions.'9' Moreover, the USA
provides an affirmative defense, entitling the defendant to show that she did not
and should not have reasonably known of the violation.'9 Thus, this framework
encourages a consistent adherence to the gatekeeping function while enabling
diligent actors to avoid liability.
190. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 192 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In hundreds of judicial and adminis-
trative proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC
have concluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § lo(b) and
Rule lob-5."); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988); see also
Steinberg, supra note 7, at 489-90 (discussing the Supreme Court's narrowing of
the scope of the federal securities laws).
191. See Baer & Dulaney, supra note 172 (discussing the massive $5.1 billion regulatory
penalty assessed against Goldman Sachs).
192. See Kim, supra note 20, at 417-18 ("[S]olutions intended to incentivize the gate-
keeper to interdict (e.g., harsh sanctions imposed on the gatekeeper who has
'knowledge' of client wrongdoing but nonetheless fails to interdict) may perversely
disincentivize monitoring. A gatekeeper who potentially faces the hard decision of
either losing one's job (being fired for resisting the wrongdoer) or losing one's
professional license (for failing to resist the wrongdoer) will prefer to cloister her-
self within her office and hear no evil." (citation omitted)).
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CONCLUSION
To achieve an equitable framework that encourages gatekeepers to better
protect the investing public, enhance the integrity of the securities markets, and
safeguard the reputation of professionals, all collateral actors-whether inside
or outside-should be held liable under the USA to the same extent. With the
massive investor losses incurred due to violations of the securities laws in the
past two decades because of scandals such as Baptist Foundation of Arizona,
Enron, Tyco, Worldcom, and the more recent Madoff and Stanford Ponzi
Schemes,' 93 the accountants' and lawyers' work product has been used to inflict
more pecuniary loss than anyone a few decades ago ever could have imagined.
Considering the staggering potential consequences of a failure in gatekeeper
vigilance, meaningful precautions should be taken to protect the vitality of the
gatekeeping system in order to help prevent similar financial debacles in the fu-
ture. The recommendations set forth in this Article aim to achieve this objec-
tive-to successfully catalyze the outside adviser's gatekeeping role without im-
posing undue liability.
193. See, e.g., Scott Cohn, Five Years After Stanford Scandal, Many Victims Penniless,
CNBC (Feb. 15, 2014, 2:23 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2ol4/o2/14/-many-victims-
penniless.html [http://perma.cc/E7FY-ZYEW] (noting that Ponzi scheme defraud-
ed investors of over $7 billion); Jan Lee, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Judgments Slam
'Gatekeepers' Ernst & Young, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.
triplepundit.com/2015/11/madoff-ponzi-scheme-judgments-slam-gate-keepers-
earnst-young/ [http://perma.cc/8JNK-G8Y7] (stating that an estimated $17 billion
was taken from aggrieved investors); Norris, supra note 16 (estimating that inves-
tors lost $350 million not including interest).
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